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Summary 
Basic education is commonly regarded as a state responsibility. However, in reality, non-state 
providers (NSPs) have always been involved in basic education service delivery, and there is 
often a blurring of boundaries between state and non-state roles with respect to financing, 
ownership, management, and regulation. In recent years, the focus on the role of non-state 
providers (NSPs) has intensified within the context of the move towards achieving Education 
for All (EFA). The paper considers this shift, with particular attention towards service 
delivery to 'underserved groups', defined as those for whom access to affordable government 
services of appropriate quality is most problematic. In some cases, this refers to particular 
sub-groups of a population within a country. In other cases (notably fragile states), it can refer 
to large sections of the country’s population. The paper indicates the wide range of NSPs that 
exist to serve different underserved groups. It notes that NSPs are commonly viewed as 
having a comparative advantage over state provision - in terms of quality, cost-effectiveness, 
choice, accountability to citizens etc. However, in reality there is very limited robust analysis 
to support some of these claims.  
 
The paper then considers the ways in which non-state providers engage with the state in 
education service delivery, including with respect to contracting, policy dialogue, and 
regulation - and the role that donors play in this relationship. The paper concludes that 
relations between NSPs and the state are not straightforward given the range of different 
providers involved in education service delivery, with those serving the better-off tending to 
dominate engagement with government. This can be at the expense of smaller-scale, informal 
providers aiming to support those otherwise under-served by government provision. As such, 
the paper argues that there is a need for ‘real’ on-going dialogue which recognises the 
diversity amongst NSPs, to ensure collaboration between NSPs and government benefits the 
underserved and so assists in moving towards the achievement of EFA goals. 
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Service Delivery 
1. Non-State Providers 
1.1 Introduction 
The focus of this study is on ‘basic education services’, with concern for the minimum service 
required to support basic needs. This requires attention to the primary level of education as 
this is the level at which education is both understood as a fundamental right, as well as 
important for human and social development (Colclough, 1996; Hannum and Buchmann, 
2005). It is, however, recognised that other levels of schooling play an important role both in 
achieving universal primary education (for example, in ensuring sufficient numbers of trained 
teachers), as well as through ensuring appropriate skills to contribute to development. 
 
State provision of primary education has commonly been justified on the grounds that there 
would be under-investment if left to the market. At the heart of this justification is the notion 
of education as a ‘public good’ given that benefits of educational investment not only accrue 
to individuals through enhanced life opportunities but also have positive contributions to 
society at large (Colclough, 1996). These benefits include contributions to economic growth 
through increased productivity in the labour market, as well as ‘externalities’ in terms of 
reduced fertility, improved health etc. Arguments in favour of state provision are made most 
forcefully in support of lower levels of education, while private benefits at higher levels are 
considered to outweigh social benefits (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). Despite the 
attention given to achieving universal primary education since targets were set at UNESCO 
regional conferences in the 1960s, which have gained even greater national and international 
attention since the 1990 Jomtien World Conference on Education for All, approximately 115 
million children of primary school-going age are estimated to be out of school (UNESCO, 
2005c). 
 
The paper is particularly concerned with service delivery to ‘underserved groups’ – meaning 
those for whom access to affordable government services of appropriate quality is most 
problematic. This raises important questions about assessment of ‘appropriate quality’, which 
cannot be easily identified in the context of education (UNESCO, 2005a). For the purposes of 
this paper, quality will be considered from the perspective of those potentially using the 
service. This includes low income households not sending children to government schools 
available on the grounds of their perceptions of poor quality, and so ‘choosing’ private 
schools. Consideration will also be given to the ‘underserved’ in terms of those unable to 
access government-provided primary education due to supply-side constraints. In the 
education context, ‘underserved’ also raises issues of other forms of exclusion (gender, street 
children, pastoralists, indigenous groups, language, faith, disability, refugees, etc.) (Sayed and 
Subrahmanian, 2003; UNESCO, 2004). These forms of exclusion may interact with income-
related poverty, but can also result in children not being able to go to school for socio-cultural 
reasons etc. (Colclough et al., 2003).  
 
In recent years, attention is being paid to the role that non-state providers are and could play 
in scaling up service delivery, particularly to those under-served by the government system. 
This is, in part, in recognition that the state has been unable to fulfil its role in extending 
access of appropriate quality to all children in the context of the Education for All (EFA) 
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agenda since the 1990s. As emphasis has been placed on expanding access to primary 
schooling including through fee abolition, private provision at relatively low fee levels has 
grown to fill the gap. In addition, in some countries, NGOs, faith-based and philanthropic 
associations also play a role in supporting education provision to those underserved by the 
government system. In addition, the global governance agenda questions the need for direct 
state provision – i.e. that while it is important to ensure schooling is available to all; this could 
be achieved through the support of different providers rather than necessarily through state 
provision, although the state generally continues to be seen as provider of last resort (World 
Bank, 2002d). Given that these non-state providers (NSPs) are potentially contributing to the 
achievement of EFA, questions arise of the ways in which government can collaborate with 
these providers, in particular to ensure that children underserved by state provision are not 
denied access to a basic education, and the role that external agencies could play in supporting 
this. Examples of such collaboration are drawn from the countries which formed the focus of 
the DFID NSP programme1, supplemented by evidence from other countries – particularly 
ones designated as ‘fragile’ – in order to gain a broader range of experience. 
1.2 Defining Non-State Provision in the Education Context 
Private education has been defined as: 
 
‘all formal schools that are not public, and may be founded, owned, managed and 
financed by actors other than the state, even in cases when the state provides most of 
the funding and has considerable control over these schools (teachers, curriculum, 
accreditations etc)’ (Kitaev, 1999: 43). 
 
This definition highlights the complexity of distinguishing between private/public spheres in 
education, with different arrangements possible in relation to provision/financing/regulation.  
Even where schools are owned and managed by the private sector, they are often subsidised 
by the government who pays the costs of curriculum development, inspection, examinations, 
and teacher training. In most cases, the state attempts to maintain some control over all 
education institutions (both private and public) through regulation (see below).  
 
‘Actors other than the state’ may include NGOs, faith-based organisations, communities and 
commercially-oriented private entrepreneurs (‘edupreneurs’), each with different motives for 
their involvement in education. There is, however, a blurring of the distinction between for-
profit and not-for-profit institutions, and the motivations for profit-making in education may 
differ between schools, with implications for the type of education offered. Tooley (2001) 
suggests, for example, that headteachers of private schools interviewed in Andhra Pradesh, 
India which were run on commercial business principles, claimed to be motivated by a 
concern for the poor communities in which they worked. On the other hand, NGOs, 
commonly thought to be philanthropic in their aims, may be established as a means to acquire 
donor resources (Miller-Grandvaux et al., 2002). 
 
Data collected by UNESCO as part of its ‘World Education Indicators’ survey classifies an 
educational institution as private ‘if is controlled and managed by a non-government 
organisation (eg religious group, association, enterprise) or if its governing body consists 
mainly of members not selected by a public agency’ (UNESCO, 2005b: 45). The report notes 
that this classification is based on governance rather than financing criteria. It further 
differentiates between government-dependent private schools – ie ones receiving more than 
                                                 
1 Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. 
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50 percent of their budget from the state; and independent private schools – ie ones receiving 
less than 50 percent of their budget from the state. 
 
There are a variety of other ways in which private and public roles intersect to provide 
education. Voucher schemes are advocated on the grounds of allowing parents and students to 
choose between different types of schools, where vouchers can be redeemed to help offset all 
or part of the cost at either public or private schools (World Bank, 2002c).2 It is suggested that 
vouchers can help to encourage innovation and, through promoting competition and choice, 
improve efficiency in both public and private schools (Patrinos, 2005). Vouchers are more 
common in relatively developed systems, including examples in Latin America, but there are 
extremely few examples of these in low-income sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Higher 
proportions of private enrolment are evident in countries where voucher schemes are in 
operation (UNESCO, 2005b). However, there are very few rigorous evaluations of voucher 
schemes in developing countries (Kremer, 2003).  
 
A more recent development is ‘contract schools’ which remain publicly owned and funded, 
but are managed by the private sector in exchange for a management fee, although again there 
are no examples of these in the sub-Saharan Africa context, and few in low-income countries 
more generally (World Bank, 2002c). It is also noted that this has been controversial in 
countries where it has occurred (Patrinos, 2005). Within public education institutions there 
may be contracting-out to private companies of some aspects of the service (for example, 
education management services, quality assurance services etc) (Pampallis, 2004). The private 
sector may also be involved in education through the supply of educational inputs to both 
private and public schools – including publication of textbooks and other learning materials, 
building schools and other infrastructure, running student hostels etc (World Bank, 2002c).  
 
Private tutoring is widespread in some countries, occurring most frequently in urban areas. 
Some tutors specialise in this activity and take it on as a full-time occupation, but more often 
it is undertaken by teachers employed in the public sector working outside school hours to 
earn extra income. In some societies this type of work is an economic necessity because 
teachers’ salaries are very low (Bray, 2003). 
  
There are numerous examples where NGOs and communities have provided support to state 
schools without taking over the overall management, with the primary responsibility for 
delivery remaining with the state. There is some concern that in sub-Saharan Africa this has 
resulted in forms of extraction from poorer communities. In reality, rural communities have 
been expected to provide support in the form of materials and labour, even though the 
intention has been to empower the communities to hold schools more accountable, while 
governments continue to support urban schools where ‘communities’ are more fragmented 
(Bray, 2000; Rose, 2003a). There are more notable innovative examples of non-state support 
to government provision in South Asian countries (Boxes 1 and 2). Even so, there is concern 
here too that government emphasis on community participation is resulting in shifting of 
responsibility. For example, in India, the 2003 Free and Compulsory Education Bill has been 
criticised for shifting the state’s constitutional responsibility to parents and local communities 
(Nair, 2004). 
 
                                                 
2 Some define voucher schemes more broadly, to include ‘voucher-like schemes’ such as targeted scholarship 
programmes (or conditional cash transfer programmes) aimed at low-income households, girls etc (see, for 
example, Patrinos, 2001). In sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian countries, these are often supported by 
international agencies and are usually focused on increasing access to government schools at the primary level. 
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 Box 1 NGO support for government schooling in India 
Pratham, an NGO that started in 1994 in Mumbai and today is operating in 13 states of India, 
runs numerous education programmes, two of which involve strengthening education in state 
schools. Its Balsakhi Remedial Education program focuses on municipal schools and is 
designed to help children who are identified by their class teachers as lagging behind 
academically. A Balaski (meaning child’s friend) is provided by Pratham, and is selected from 
the local community with a 12 grade education. The Balsakhis work with 25-30 children and 
are sent to schools on the request of the headteachers.  
 
Its Akhar Setu Programme focuses on children who are working or supporting their parents 
and therefore are unable to attend regular school. Under this programme children are formally 
registered in a nearby Government school with the rights and privileges similar to that of 
children regularly attending that government school. Pratham holds regular classes for these 
children in the community. Children are allowed to participate in all the extra curricular 
activities of the schools. All the children are required to take the exam conducted by the 
school and get their certificate from the school. The head teacher of the school to which such 
a student is affiliated is required to make a periodic and random visit to this class and verify 
attendance once a month.  
 
Source: http://www.pratham.org/ [accessed 1/2/2006] 
 
Box 2 Non-state support to primary teacher training in Pakistan 
Some philanthropic or high-fee charging schools in Pakistan have engaged in programmes 
that can help strengthen the quality of education in government primary schools. For example, 
the Ali Institute’s Training and Resource Centres, which are primarily meant to serve schools 
with poor children, are hosted in a well-off private or philanthropic school in the area. The 
school provides the space for the resource centre and the training sessions. It also covers other 
expenses, at times including the trainers’ salaries, while the trainer provides training to all the 
state schools and non-formal community schools in the area. These schools, however, bear 
none of the costs. The reason the well-off schools agree to such an arrangement is that this is 
still a more economical way for the richer schools to train their teachers rather than sending 
them on the teacher training courses run commercially by the Ali Institute or Aga Khan 
Institute of Education, Karachi. Some international donors, including DFID, have supported 
this initiative at various stages.  
 
Similarly, VSO teacher trainers are popular with the private and philanthropic schools given 
the high demand for primary and English language teacher trainers. However, due to its 
growing focus on working with the poor, VSO in the past few years had started to refuse 
providing trainers to elite schools. But, given the continuing demand for trainers from the elite 
schools on the one hand, and the failure of the Pakistani government to utilise these trainers 
on the other hand, VSO Pakistan adopted a ‘cluster approach’. Under this approach, the elite 
schools requesting for the VSO trainer host the trainer and provide the monthly salary but 
they have to share the trainer with four to five government or community schools in the area  
 
Sources: VSO, 2000 & 2001. http://www.aie.edu.pk/tarcAreas.htm [accessed 1/2/2006] 
 
In summary, definitions of NSPs indicate a blurring of boundaries between state and non-state 
responsibilities, indicating different ways in which they can cooperate in service delivery. 
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This ranges from NSP support to government service delivery in relation to supporting the 
supply of inputs, management, and associated services to non-state management and running 
of government schools, as well as their independent establishment of non-state schools (Table 
1). In addition, governments and NSPs may take responsibility for different aspects of service 
delivery, requiring different forms of interaction (Table 2). Each of these forms of interaction 
imply a different relationship with the state, which can range from informal to formal 
contractual arrangements, as well as different roles in policy dialogue, forms of regulation, 
and of facilitation, as discussed below.  
Table 1 Summary of scope and forms of non-state provision for basic education service 
delivery 
 










NSP support to government service delivery 
• Supply inputs to government schools (eg learning 
materials) 
• Support infrastructure development (eg school 
building) of government schools 
• Support management of government-run schools 
• Supply associated services (eg inspection, teacher 
training) 
NSP service delivery 
• Manage and run government schools 
• Establishment and running of non-state schools 
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Table 2 Examples of areas of government/NSP responsibility 
 
Function Government/Private responsibility 
Setting of policy objectives Predominantly government, with varying but often weak 
consultation and engagement with NSPs. 
Curriculum development Government responsibility in all but usually high cost 
international, private schools 
Assessment and examinations Government responsibility except in high cost schools 
taking international qualifications 
Monitoring and regulation: 
 
• setting of fee levels 
 
• length of school day/year 
 
 




• teacher pay and 
conditions 
 
• class size 
 
 
• type of facilities 
Government regulation/self-regulation 
  
Fee levels often not regulated by government 
 
Generally set by governments but often not regulated, 
with variations for NGOs in particular 
 
In principle, expected to conform with national policy, 
but in practice often in an international language (eg 
English) in private schools 
 
Usually at the discretion of NSP; may or may not be 
subject to labour law requirements 
 
Under control of governing bodies and proprietors; may 
be subject to nominal regulation 
 
Generally specified in government regulations for 
licensing and registration of private schools; often not 
enforced 
Funding and taxation Wide range of wholly NSP funding to subsidies of 
different kinds, including payment of teacher salaries in 
some systems 
Source: Adapted from Rose, 2005a. 
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2. Scale and Importance of NSPs 
In most countries, it remains the case that government is the main provider of education, with 
private providers filling the gap in poor quality government provision (meeting excess 
demand); NGOs, philanthropic associations and communities providing access to those 
unable to access the government system (due to insufficient or inappropriate supply), and 
religious organisations meeting differentiated demand. Some non-state providers provide 
access to schooling opportunities for the poor, either explicitly as part of the design of their 
programme or by default, in response to excess demand to which the government is unable to 
respond. 
 
NSPs have a long history of educational service delivery in many developing countries. These 
include the activities of missionaries and other faith based organisations, those of not-for-
profit community and international NGOs often focusing on under-served areas, and those of 
for-profit private institutions catering to domestic elites. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, NSPs 
were established prior to mass public education (Peano, 1997). In many of these countries 
post-independence, education systems were nationalized. However, in practice this was 
untenable and, by the 1980s, in the context of economic liberalization more generally, 
governments began again to recognize and tolerate their existence, and sometimes actively 
encourage their provision. 
 
Of the NSP countries, with the exception of Pakistan, most children gain initial access to 
primary schooling (UNESCO, 2005a). However, apart from South Africa, a significant 
number of children are unable to complete the primary cycle, with dropout from school 
caused by both demand-side factors related to cost and labour demands, and supply-side 
factors affecting distance from school and (perceptions) of quality (Colclough et al., 2003). 
The poor are most likely not to be in school (Figure 1).  These children are most likely to 
reside in rural areas, where school provision is most constrained (UNESCO, 2005c).  
 
  7
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Malawi Nigeria South Africa Bangladesh India  
 
Note: DFID NSP project countries - Data unavailable for Pakistan. However, 
alternative sources confirm this pattern in Pakistan - the net enrolment rate is 37 
percent for the poor compared with 59 percent for the non-poor. This pattern persists 
across rural and urban regions of all provinces (World Bank, 2002a). 
 
(Source: UNESCO, 2005c). 
2.1 Private Provision 
Private providers of basic education in many developing countries offer services across a wide 
spectrum of fee levels. Those of particular concern for this paper are ones charging relatively 
low fees, including unregistered schools. Such schools are usually small scale (often with 
fewer pupils, teachers and space compared with nearby government schools), and owned by 
individual proprietors. Providers mainly run schools as a business drawing on their own 
capital, motivated partly by profit although this is not always explicit particularly where it is 
not legally permitted, as in South Africa.  
 
World Bank poverty assessments and education sector studies for most DFID priority 
countries highlight that demand for primary schooling is on the rise, which in some countries 
has led to excess demand for government school places. Universal primary education 
campaigns accompanied by abolition of primary school fees in many countries during the 
1990s are considered by many as an important factor in increasing the demand for education 
in these countries. In Uganda Universal Primary Education (UPE) campaigns, together with 
abolition of primary school fees in 1997, are reported to have led to heightened demand for 
education (World Bank, 2002b). In India, from 1986 there were numerous educational 
initiatives ranging from the Total Literacy Campaign and Operation Blackboard to District 
Primary Education Programme and Lok Jumbish, that concentrated on building up parental 
 8
Supporting Non-State Providers in Basic Education 
demand for education and on expanding and improving the government school system 
especially at primary level. This increased demand for primary education also seems to have 
influenced the mushrooming of private schools (De et. al., 2002).  
 
UNESCO is the main, and most widely cited, source of internationally available data on 
private education.3 However, these data only include officially registered private enrolment, 
and do not differentiate between the different types of private schooling, which can often 
range from those catering for the elite, to low-budget private schools. Data from this source 
need to be treated with utmost caution. Variations between countries and fluctuations between 
years are as likely to be due to differences in definitions and data collection as they are to 
changes in enrolment patterns.4 Comparisons between countries are also problematic due to 
different lengths of school cycles (for example, the primary level in Malawi is an eight year 
cycle, while in Bangladesh it is five years). The limited evidence available suggests that 
private provision has been growing in recent years, although it remains small compared to 
government provision at the primary level (see Appendix 1) (Rose, 2005a).  
 
National data on private schools are usually available in some form, although still often with 
significant gaps, either because data are not collected for unregistered schools, or because 
governments do not see it as their responsibility to collect data on private schools even where 
these are registered, and/or because private schools do not consider that they need to inform 
the government of their activities (Kitaev, 1999; Kingdon, 2005). It has also been argued that 
school return data are unreliable because failing/unpopular publicly-funded non-state schools 
exaggerate their student numbers in order to justify their existence (Dreze and Kingdon, 
2001). Available national data in the DFID NSP project countries suggest that the share of 
private primary enrolment is highest, on average, in countries where overall enrolment is 
lowest (approximately one-fifth of those enrolled are in private schools in Pakistan), and 
lowest where the vast majority of children are able to complete the primary cycle (three 
percent in South Africa) (Kardar, 2001; Kardar, 2002; Dieltens, 2002; Rose, 2005b; 
Hinchcliffe, 2002).  
 
There are indications that the increase in for-profit private schools is a relatively recent 
phenomenon for most countries. Even China, which has maintained a centralised state 
schooling system for many decades, has in recent years started to encourage involvement of 
the private sector. In the early 1980’s private schools were set up in cities like Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen and Beijing. By the end of 1998, there were about 8.6 million students at private 
elementary schools, although this was still only approximated to 1 percent of the total 
enrolment in elementary schools. With liberalisation of the economy more general, their share 
is steadily growing (Jiang, 2000). 
 
Private provision also varies considerably within countries. Tooley’s mapping of private 
schools in selected urban and peri-urban areas in India, Ghana and Nigera provides an 
indication of the extent of private provision in such contexts, highlighting that it can often be 
                                                 
3 The Statistical Profile of Education in SSA (SPESSA) database set up by ADEA (www.adea.org) also includes 
data on the percentage of private teachers in private schools, and of private schools at the primary and secondary 
levels. On the whole, these show similar patterns to the enrolment data shown here. The World Bank EdStats 
database (www.worldbank.org/edstats) includes information on private expenditure on education, although this 
does not differentiate between expenditure in private and public institutions. 
4 For example, UNESCO data indicate relatively high private enrolment in Bangladesh: this is due to the 
inclusion of Registered Non-Government Schools which are heavily subsidised by government (who pays most 
teacher salaries and other recurrent costs). 
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extensive, implying that the efforts required to achieve EFA in these areas might be less than 
conventionally expected. For example, in Ghana, Tooley’s (2005) study suggests that some 
private schools, many of them ‘unrecognised’, operate in low income urban periphery areas 
and provide better quality primary education to poor households, than state schools. His 
research indicates that in a slum area (Ga) outside the capital, Accra, approximately two-thirds 
of children are enrolled in private schools, one-third of whom are in unregistered schools. 
Tooley’s analysis of the low income urban periphery cannot, however, be extended to a 
typical rural household population. Low income urban populations, such as the Ga district in 
Ghana, actually have access to resources that the typical rural poor is unlikely to have, even to 
afford the most highly subsidised private school. A USAID sponsored survey (2002) of 
public/private schools in Ghana in 2001 found that most parents of pupils attending private 
schools were traders (34%) or had jobs in the public sector (about 15%), while over one-half 
of parents of children in government schools were farmers. 
 
In Nigeria, three-quarters of children in school are estimated to be enrolled in registered and 
unregistered private schools in the economic centre of the country of Lagos state (Tooley, 
2005) compared with around one-fifth in Enugu (Hinchcliffe, 2002). Even so, according to 
Tooley’s estimates, about one-quarter of children remain out of school even in Lagos. In 
Pakistan, before 1990, less than 20 percent of all private schools established were located in 
rural regions, but from 1990 to 2000, this number has increased, and now remains stable at 
close to 50 percent. However, the enrollment in urban private schools still outnumbers that of 
rural private schools by a ratio of 3:1 (World Bank, 2002a). A study comparing a rural and 
urban school in Balochistan, Pakistan, shows that urban parents were more willing and better 
able to pay for private schooling. Also, the authors argue that rural areas are less likely to 
support large number of private schools simply because of practical modalities of running 
private schools. In the urban areas, the schools have advantages like attracting good managers 
and teachers at a relatively low cost and are particularly successful in attracting female 
teachers (Alderman et. al., 2003). 
 
India has also witnessed a surge in private schools. According to official statistics, in 1993, 
only 2.8 per cent of all rural primary school students in India were studying in private schools 
but according to household survey data for the same year, 10.1 per cent of all rural Indian 6-
10 year old school attendees went to a private school (Kingdon, 2005). Household survey data 
over time shows that in urban India, 61 per cent of the increase in total primary schools 
enrolment in the period 1986-1993 was absorbed by private schools. In rural India the rate of 
expansion of private primary schooling was slower: only about one-fifth of the increase in 
rural primary enrolment was taken up by private schools (Kingdon, 2005).  Kerala is the state 
in India that subsidises the highest proportion of private schools in addition to providing 
scholarships and transportation subsidies. It is argued that this could have supported the high 
proportion of children in school compared with other states (although an important reason for 
this is historical emphasis on social development in Kerala, with relatively high levels of 
government expenditure). Even so, government schools are found to serve the poor more than 
private-aided schools, with the smallest proportion of the poor in private-unaided schools 
(World Bank, 2003, cited in Nair, 2004).  There is some evidence in India of elite private 
schools providing school places for the poor, albeit through providing a differentiated 
education maintaining an advantage to those who are able to pay (Box 3). While 
differentiation may support children who would otherwise have difficulties learning in a 
language with which they are not familiar, for example, it can raise implications for post-
schooling opportunities for different groups of children depending on the type of education 
they are offered. 
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Box 3 Elite schools reaching out to the poor - case from India 
In India some private schools have initiated ‘private school outreach’ programmes. These 
private schools go beyond their usual remit of providing fee-charging education to the 
middle/upper classes and extend their services to provide a fee affordable education to 
children in the local area who are out of school. However, a study of three such schools 
suggests that most of their efforts do not bridge the existing gap marking the quality of 
education available to the rich and the poor. These private schools provide formal English 
medium education to a largely middle/upper class clientele, which follows a set curriculum 
with school leaving examinations that are officially recognized by the government. Their 
outreach programmes, on the other hand, only provide a basic education in the vernacular 
medium to children who would otherwise be out of school.  
 
Source: Ashley Day (2005) 
 
2.2 NGO Provision 
Since the late 1980s, across many DFID priority countries, there has been a rise in a relatively 
new form of civil society organisations/NGOs. The New Policy Agenda which focused on 
economic liberalisation and democratic governance had an important role to play in this, 
leading to channelling of international development aid to developing countries through non-
state groups (Edwards & Hulme, 1995). Most NGOs in these countries draw on donor funds, 
often channelled through international NGOs who in turn work with national NGOs. NGOs 
focus on reaching out to children from poor communities, particularly in the underprivileged 
areas of these countries.  
 
Two types of international agency-supported NGO schools are discernible: ones intending to 
integrate ultimately into the state system (a model adopted by SCF-UK – see Molteno et al., 
1999), and ones operating as an alternative to the state system (as adopted by SCF-US, with 
the support of USAID). Those intending to integrate into the state system usually operate in a 
similar way to state schools, using the same curriculum for example. The involvement of the 
community in these schools is more limited, and can be seen as a temporary, stop-gap, 
solution in response to the lack of government resources.  
 
A USAID assessment of NGO education programmes in Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi and Mali 
(where USAID is supporting national NGOs through SCF-US) argues that their roles are 
similar across the four countries. Most are working at the community level to mobilise parents 
and other local non-governmental actors to improve conditions and accountability at school 
levels. It shows that some types of NGO-supported community schools exist in all four 
countries, often with donor funding. It further argues that in all four countries governments 
were keen to have NGOs involved in social mobilisation or sensitization programmes to 
encourage demand for schooling, an activity usually beyond the current scope of government 
activities (Miller-Grandvaux et al., 2002). In countries such as India and Bangladesh, there is 
a relatively long history of indigenous NGO service delivery (with BRAC non-formal 
provision dating from 1985, and dating from the 19th century social reform movement in 
India) (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005; Nair, 2004).  
 
Examples of non-state provision intentionally aimed at delivering services to the poor are 
most evident with regard to NGO provision, with experience from Bangladesh frequently 
cited as providing an innovative example. One of the motivations of NGO involvement in 
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education in Bangladesh is reported to be related to a small (but growing) educated urban elite 
which has a strong commitment to modern education for the masses for instrumental reasons 
(i.e. to transform behaviour and attitudes of the poor in ways which are likely to have broader 
benefits) (Hossain et al, 2002). While such NGOs provide an important contribution to those 
underserved by the government system, even in Bangladesh this only comprises about seven 
percent of total enrolment (CAMPE, 2004). Of these, 60 percent are enrolled in the BRAC 
primary education programme, with BRAC also sub-contracting primary education 
programmes to smaller, local NGOs (BRAC, nd). Moreover, the BRAC model has been 
replicated in other contexts, including in countries such as Malawi and Pakistan, with support 
from international donors and INGOs, with varying results (see below). In Pakistan, NGOs of 
this kind are a more recent phenomenon, evident in particular since 2000 (Bano, 2005), 
emphasised under the heavily donor funded Social Action Programme (SAP).  
 
Alternative provision by NGOs to meet the needs of those excluded from formal schooling 
(including, for example, those in remote areas, pastoralists, street-children, refugees etc, 
requiring more flexible modes of delivery) may be considered more acceptable by 
governments than commercially-orientated private provision because they exist between state 
and market, and so do not threaten their monopoly over formal schooling (Bennell, 2003). 
However, there may be limits to this. As NGO provision expands, it is likely to lead to 
concern for alignment of NGO and government provision to ensure graduates from NGO 
schools can attend government secondary schools, for example, requiring some equivalency 
of qualifications, as the experience of BRAC indicates. On the other hand, NGOs may also 
compete with governments for donor resources, which can result in antagonism between 
NGOs and governments.  
 
In some cases, NGO provision may be the only form of provision, rather than an alternative – 
for example, in fragile environments where states do not have the will and/or capacity to 
provide (Meagher, 2005 – Table 3).5 This is particularly apparent where donors are 
supporting service delivery, but unable or unwilling to work through governments. In 
Afghanistan, NGOs have supported a similar kind of non-formal community based school, 
even during the Taliban period. The NGOs working in the education sector along with other 
NGOs also established the umbrella Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). 
Similarly, in the post-war reconstruction plans for Afghanistan NGOs have been given a 
prominent role by all donors in establishing primary schools as well as improving the services 









                                                 
5 More review of education service delivery approaches in different types of fragile state will be addressed more 
systematically in another paper currently under preparation. 
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Table 3 Fragile states and service delivery 
 
Type of fragile 
state 
Service delivery options 
Deterioration • Where some willingness exists: central government approaches viable. 
• If low willingness, use local government provision supplemented by 
client power approaches: INGO provision, CBAs, co-production, 
markets. 
• Local government partnership depends on revenue autonomy, may 
require support for tax recovery and budgeting.  
• Supplement market approaches to SD with livelihood support. 
Post-conflict 
transition 
• INGO provision is dominant; CBAs may also be important.  
• Engage government early to build capacity where willingness exists, to 
establish social policy framework, to plan complementary interventions 
(e.g. livelihoods and schooling). 
• Prioritizing, sequencing, and bundling are necessary.  
• Emphasis on security, public safety, peace-building, low-tech service 
packages for remote or rebel-held areas. 
Arrested 
development 
• Priority is on client power approaches: INGO provision, CBAs, co-
production, markets.  
• Where possible, strengthen information flows, client purchasing power. 
• Seek out willing ministries and local governments, but engage with 
caution, due to likely political control by regime. 
Early recovery • ‘Adopt’ central ministries where appropriate; plan for handover.  
• Build capacity of state and service providers; strengthen social policy 
framework. 
 
(Source: Meagher, 2005). 
 
In all the DFID priority countries, there are examples of NGOs focusing on advocacy with the 
aim to influence government education policy, and this can play a more important part of their 
role than direct service delivery. National NGOs and coalitions in Malawi and Nigeria, for 
example, are more concerned with campaigning for improved quality and coverage of 
government schooling rather than their own direct provision since they see basic service 
delivery as the responsibility of the state. Advocacy roles can be bolstered by piloting of NGO 
schools, drawing on innovative experience for campaigning purposes (Kadzamira and Rose, 
2005; Adelabu and Rose, 2005).     
2.3 Spontaneous Community Provision 
The establishment and support of schools by communities has always been evident in many 
countries, often as a response to the failure of government provision. Colenso (2005) notes 
two phases in community-based approaches to education - first, investing in ‘traditional’ links 
between schools and communities (e.g. parent-teacher associations, school management 
committees, ‘voluntary’ cash and in-kind community contributions); and second more formal 
transfer of school management and service provision to communities. Community 
participation has been continuously promoted and formalised through both international and 
national policy, with even greater attention paid to it in recent years. It is not coincidental that 
a more explicit emphasis on community participation has corresponded with the economic 
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crises which have adversely affected education systems in sub-Saharan African countries 
since the 1980s, together with rapid expansion of school systems in the context of the drive 
for achieving universal primary education and associated abolition of fees to stimulate 
demand, necessitating the search for alternative sources of resources (Bray with Lillis, 1988; 
Bray, 1996; Shaeffer, 1992; Watt, 2001). 
 
With respect to community involvement in service delivery, there are examples of 
communities organising themselves to temporarily fill a gap in government provision. 
However, there are fewer examples of schools established through the initiative of 
communities themselves which are sustained without external influence of an NGO, 
government, or a donor.6 Where there is dependence on community provision without other 
forms of support, there is concern for an inferior teaching environment given the severely 
constrained resources available, including for paying teachers. This is evident in Zambia, for 
example, where community-initiated schools multiplied in the 1990s as government resources 
to its own provision dwindled in the context of economic austerity measures (Kelly, 1998, 
cited in Bray, 2000). As a result, community schools became overflow ‘state’ schools in urban 
Zambia, differing from government schools as they are completely funded by local 
contributions and fees (Hyde, 2003). Bray (2000) argues for government partnerships with 
such types of community schools if they are to survive and be effective. 
 
Spontaneous community schools involve the community in construction and management of 
schools. In Kenya, for example, the secondary system evolved largely as a result of 
community support through Harambee schools. These are seen as one of closest examples in 
sub-Saharan Africa to ‘spontaneous grassroots initiative for the delivery of education’ (Rugh 
and Bossert 1998: 36). However, over time, the lower quality of these schools compared with 
government schools became increasingly apparent, given the limited time and resources 
communities were able to provide. In general, boys benefited more from the better-resourced 
state schools while girls were over-represented in the poorer quality community schools 
(Rugh and Bossert, 1998). Harambee schools became merged into the government system in 
the mid 1980s, when all non-private schools began to receive the same per student 
government subsidy, although their structures and facilities remained of poorer quality.  
 
Bangladesh offers an interesting example of community-initiated schools, where 
approximately one-quarter of children are enrolled in Registered Non-Government Primary 
Schools (RNGPS) (Primary Mass Education Division, 2002). These schools primarily serve 
relatively poor areas of the country, with a recent study indicating that a larger proportion of 
those enrolled in RNGPSs are from households below the national poverty line, compared 
with those in government schools (Asian Development Bank, 2003). As discussed below, 
once these schools become registered they share characteristics with government schools, 
although differences remain with respect to recruitment of teachers and aspects of school 
management which continue to be locally-based. 
 
Payne and Fraser (2004, cited in Colenso 2005) suggest that, where no other providers 
(government or other forms of NSP) are delivering education, that communities will manage 
to set up schools, find teachers and pay them, with evidence of this occurring in conflict-
affected areas and fragile states. Most schools opened during the civil war in southern Sudan 
are referred to as ‘bush schools’, mainly with outdoor classrooms. The curriculum context and 
                                                 
6 The majority of the examples of community schools included in Miller-Grandvaux and Yoler’s (2002a) review 
are ones supported by international NGOs and so are considered under the previous section in relation to NGO 
provision for the purposes of this paper. 
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school syllabus are not standardised across the primary schools, with the school syllabus of 
the neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Kenya often adopted. According to an 
education baseline survey report, almost every primary school in southern Sudan has a 
community or parents’ group involved in its management. Besides building schools, the local 
communities maintain these schools, cover part of teachers’ salaries or incentives and pay 
school fees for their children (Brophy, 2003; Deng, 2003).  
2.4 Faith-based Provision 
In many countries, faith-based provision of schooling preceded, and formed the basis for, 
government provision. In most of African countries, the Church has been an important 
provider of education, and established formal schooling in many countries in the late 19th 
century. While these were mainly nationalised following independence from colonialism, the 
church continued to play a role in the management of the schools that they established. In 
Lesotho 90 percent of the schools are still run by churches while the government covers most 
of the costs, including paying teachers (World Bank, 2005b). From early this century until 
1953 all education for the African population of South Africa was provided largely by 
religious organisations, mainly the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church 
(Mazibuko, 2000). 
 
In both Malawi and Nigeria, the role of church in their schools has changed over the last 
century, from running and financing, to handing over responsibility to government, with more 
recent discussions about handing these responsibilities back to the churches. Ministry of 
Education data in Malawi indicate that, in 2000, churches owned about 64 percent of the 
primary schools, while government and local education authorities owned about 34 percent 
(MIM and IPRAD, 2004). As in other parts of SSA, the reasons for this are historical: formal 
education was introduced by missionaries in the late part of the 19th century and from that 
time until independence in 1964 they were the major providers of education (Kadzamira and 
Kunje, 2002). The synods owning the schools aim to ensure that the headteacher is of the 
same faith, and also have representatives of the church on the school management committee. 
In other respects, they are funded, managed and regulated in the same way as government 
schools with some additional support provided by church education secretariats. More 
recently, financial pressures have led to the government considering handing back assisted 
and grant-aided schools to their proprietors. However, the government backtracked after it 
realised that this would comprise the majority of government schools, and would mean 
relinquishing its control over the education system. In addition, churches realised that taking 
back control of their schools would effectively mean privatising them as they would no longer 
receive financial support from the government, and do not have sufficient resources of their 
own. Unlike previously, the churches no longer receive a substantial amount of donations 
from missions overseas, and so now have to be self-sufficient. As a result, they would have to 
charge fees to maintain the schools. Thus, only 8 out of 2834 schools owned by churches are 
classified as private (MIM and IPRAD, 2004). 
 
In South Asia, missionary schools have also traditionally been important providers of 
education. At the same time madrasahs (Islamic religious seminaries) have provided free 
boarding and lodging to their students. Unlike the Church, which in some countries educated 
the elite while in others was the main provider of education, madrasahs in Pakistan cater 
exclusively to the poor. Currently, 1 percent of the total school going children are estimated to 
be enrolled with madrasahs (Andrabi et al, 2005) although some studies give much higher 
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numbers. For example, International Crisis Group (ICG) estimates that 33 percent of Pakistani 
children enrolled in schools go to madrasahs (ICG, 2002).  
 
Provision through madrasahs can vary with respect to the extent to which they are primarily 
run in parallel with the government system (as has been the case in Pakistan), or are 
complementary to government provision, integrating the national curriculum alongside more 
traditional Islamic teaching (as currently emphasised in Northern Nigeria). Motivations for 
governments (and donors) to engage with such religious schools might have less to do with 
concern for their effectiveness and more to do with political concerns. In the 1980s, for 
example, the Pakistani government started to give grants to madrasahs but at the same time it 
encouraged Pakistani madrasahs to support and train the Afghani fighters for the soviet-
afghan war. Madrasahs which took in large numbers of the Afghan students received 
increased government grants (Malik, 1996). Since 2001, the Pakistani government is again 
providing financial incentives to madrasahs under a US-funded programme, but this time for 
exactly the opposite reason: to disarm these madrasahs of militancy that the state itself had 
encouraged in the 1980s. In India, attempts by government to register madrasahs has had 
limited effect. For example, in the pro-muslim state of Uttar Pradesh, a Madrasah Education 
Board was set up. However, only 120 out of approximately 20,000 madrasahs registered given 
fears that this would result in excessive government control (Thakore, 2002, cited in Nair, 
2004).  
2.5 Philanthropic Provision 
Philanthropic provision also has a long tradition in some countries. In South Asia 
philanthropic associations funded both by individual donations as well as family trusts have 
been devoted to provision of primary education (PCP, 2002). These organisations have 
normally focused on the poorest sections of the society. In the Northern Areas of Pakistan, the 
Aga Khan Foundation, which currently runs 130 schools in the area, has provided free 
education to the local communities since 1940s (Harlech-Jones et al, 2005). Free schooling 
for orphan children, including lodging facilities, remains to date one of the most dominant 
activities among the charitable organisations in Pakistan. Anjuman-Hamayiat-Islam (Lahore), 
and Anjuman Faizul Islam (Rawalpindi) are two of the most prominent examples. Innovative 
experience of philanthropic associations supporting government provision is also evident in 
the example of the Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE), 
supported by philanthropic contributions from individual and corporate funders in Pakistan. In 
addition to establishing its own private schools, since 1998 it has been involved in the 
rehabilitation and management of dilapidated government schools in Lahore characterised by 
high rates of teacher absenteeism.  
 
There is extremely limited evidence of philanthropic provision in sub-Saharan African 
countries. This gives the impression that such provision is less visible. A possible explanation 
for this is the importance of a sizeable middle-class and elite for such philanthropic work 
which might be more apparent in some South Asian countries than in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, the validity of this requires more systematic exploration. 
2.6 Summary  
Overall, from the available evidence on the size and scope of NSP provision according to 
these different types of providers across DFID priority countries drawing on available 
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evidence,7 it is apparent that data are often not available or are extremely unreliable, and 
information available by type of provider is variable (Rose, 2005a). In order to obtain a 
clearer picture of the types of provision that exist and so the possibilities for scaling-up to 
underserved groups, there is an urgent need for mapping of provision in most countries. 
Where mapping of private schools has been undertaken, this has usually been in a relatively 
confined context. For example Tooley’s work (2005) in India, Nigeria and Ghana has focused 
on urban and peri-urban relatively-densely populated areas, which cannot be generalised 
across countries, particularly where the majority of the population live in more sparsely 
populated rural areas where private entrepreneurs might also be less apparent – as in many 
sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
The evidence available does indicate, however, that different NSPs cater to those underserved 
by government provision in a variety of ways (Table 4). Variations of the types, roles and 
scope of providers across different contexts is likely to depend on the ideological disposition 
of the state (based on a neo-liberal or rights-based orientation), its capacity and will, as well as 
the nature of civil society (including the existence of a middle class committed to a 






























                                                 
7 Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam 
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Table 4 Forms of exclusion addressed by NSPs 
NSPs Exclusion addressed Government recognition Funding Examples 
Private Low-income groups in urban 
and peri-urban areas, supporting 
excess demand in context of 
perceived low quality 
government provision. 
Do not address exclusion of 
poorest, or non-income 
exclusion, eg gender, caste 
Include registered and 
unregistered schools – 
unregistered schools do not 
receive state support. 
Contribution is often not 













NGOs Hard-to-reach groups requiring 
alternative service delivery 
models, adopting small-scale 
innovative approaches – eg 
pastoralists, street children, 
language minority groups, 
refugees etc. 
Registration often not on 
education-related criteria. 
Usually do not receive state 
support. 
May or may not be explicitly 




















Responsive to differentiated 
demand, and may include moral 
obligation to cater for the poor 
Some registered (particularly if 
grant-aided), and recognised in 
government policy 
Others choose to avoid 


















Demand-driven provision often 
in rural areas 
Often undergo process of 
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3. Comparative Advantage of NSPs in Reaching the Underserved 
 
Most stakeholders (including NGOs and the government itself) continue to view primary 
education provision as the responsibility of the government, with non-state provision seen as 
complementary to this. From an economic perspective, social benefits are considered to 
outweigh private benefits particularly at lower levels of education. This is complemented by a 
rights-based perspective reinforced by concern for the importance of education’s role in 
national cohesion through a common curriculum and opportunities for social mobility. Where 
NGOs are involved in provision this is usually viewed as a short-term solution to inadequate 
government provision as well as providing innovate approaches from which lessons can be 
learnt. NGOs usually intend to have exit strategy seeing their role as temporarily supporting 
government provision, although the transition from NGO to government provision can be 
difficult to achieve in practice (see below).  
 
There are exceptions to the view that education should be primarily government’s 
responsibility, particularly from a neo-liberal ideological perspective, with some private 
providers and other proponents of private provision viewing NSPs as not only desirable in 
filling an immediate gap, but also seeing possibilities for its extension given their perceived 
advantages over government provision. This view is supported by the International Finance 
Corporation arm of the World Bank (Tooley, 2005; Karmokias and van Lutsenburg Maas, 
1997).8
 
As discussed in this section, poor quality of state education, lack of state ability to provide 
state-schooling to all, as well as cost-effectiveness, responsiveness and accountablity of 
private fee-charging schools, are key reasons put forward for the recent attention paid to NSP. 
3.1 Extending Access to Those Underserved by Government Provision 
As mentioned, the EFA agenda has been an important influence on increasing demand which 
is not always satisfactorily met by government provision of appropriate quality. At the same 
time, some marginalised groups continue to be underserved due to the type of government 
provision offered. 
 
The abolition of primary school fees in a number of countries in SSA has had a significant 
impact on enrolment. In Tanzania, the number of children enrolled in primary schools 
increased by 3 million in 2001, with this rapid growth largely a result of the decision to 
abolish primary school fees (Wedgwood, 2005). In Uganda, primary enrolment doubled 
following the 1997 abolition of fees, and increased by 50 percent in Malawi, resulting in a 
narrowing of primary enrolment gaps between rich and poor and between boys and girls in 
both countries (Colclough et al., 2003). The effects of fee abolition indicate that demand-side 
financial constraints had been by far the most important reason for low primary enrolment 
across different SSA countries. However, this has been accompanied by deteriorating quality 
of schooling (particularly noticeable with respect to large class sizes in lower primary school 
grades) as governments have been constrained by limited resources and capacity and so have 
not been able to respond sufficiently to the quantitative expansion (World Bank, 2002b; 
Kadzamira and Rose, 2003). As a result, in Malawi, for example, for-profit private schools are 
reported to have mushroomed in urban and peri-urban areas following democratic elections 
                                                 
8 See also www.ifc.org/edinvest 
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leading to both the introduction of Free Primary Education in Malawi as part of the election 
promise, simultaneously with the change in the political climate. Even so, observations 
suggest that the size of NSP is very small relative to state provision (Kadzamira and Rose, 
2005).  
 
As noted, flexible approaches adopted by NGOs enable them to reach parts of the population 
that the government is unable to reach, including in remote areas, pastoralists, refugees, street-
children etc., which require alternative and more flexible modes of delivery. Part of their 
advantage is the ability to work innovatively on a small-scale, at a local level. The intention 
might then be for such provision to be scaled up and integrated with government provision. 
3.2 Choice 
A key argument in favour of NSP in education is that this will provide a choice, with a view 
that this can be important even to relatively low income groups: 
 
‘It is sometimes argued that many of the lowest-cost private schools provide a very 
low-quality education and, consequently, poor parents are defrauded by such 
disreputable schools…Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that a wide quality-
price range is efficient and responsive to the variety of felt needs…Attendance in low 
cost, low quality private schools is a result of free choice. Consequently, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that consumers are not making a rational benefit/cost/risk 
calculation when they decide to enroll and re-enroll their children or themselves in 
such schools, given that they have the public school option available to them. It makes 
little sense to deny lower income groups such choices, simply because educational 
standards in some inexpensive schools have lower quality standards than more 
expensive schools patronized by higher-income groups.’ (Karmokolias and van 
Lutsenburg Maas (1997): 1 and 12. Emphasis added). 
 
Alternatively, in some cases non-state provision might be the only option for some, often the 
less well-off who are unable to get access to the limited public school system. An extreme 
example is highlighted by Salmi (1997), who points out that, in the case of Haiti where the 
public sector caters for just 10 percent of the primary school-aged population, some families 
only have the choice of private schooling where 75 percent of primary school children are 
enrolled. Thus, the growth of private schools has been a substitution for public investment, 
not an addition. This has occurred in conditions where internal political conflicts have been 
accompanied by the disintegration of public institutions (Wolff and Castro, 2001). 
 
A study by VSO in Punjab, Pakistan, records concerns of the government school teachers that 
student attendance in government schools can be undermined by competition from NGO 
schools, which provide financial incentives, for example school feeding programmes and 
take-home rations of edible oils (VSO, 2005).  
3.3 Cost-effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness is an important motivation for the advocacy of NSPs. It is argued that 
lower costs per student in private schools can be apparent alongside higher quality and 
efficiency. However, given problems in delineating the private education sector, and in 
obtaining accurate information on its financing, very few studies are available to examine 
adequately the validity of claims that private schools are more cost-effective than public 
schools. It is often difficult to calculate the precise amounts spent on private institutions since 
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some of the resources are provided through tax breaks, government funding of teacher 
training, curriculum design, and sometimes contributions to teacher salaries. Religious 
institutions often receive substantial funding from their affiliated organisations, not all of 
which may be accounted for.  Where textbooks are provided to private schools this is another 
form of government subsidy which is often not accounted for.  
 
Furthermore, the objectives of private and public education may differ, making direct 
comparisons problematic. For example, social goals of public schools may give them a 
mandate to educate disabled students, the costs of which are likely to be significantly greater 
(Wolff and Castro, 2001). By contrast, private schools may focus attention on examination 
success, rather than ensuring a broader education to students. As such, Colcough (1996) 
argues that relative cost effectiveness may never be satisfactorily answered, perhaps because 
in many contexts public and private schools are very different products. According to Peano 
(1997: 64), there is ‘an eternal debate’ on whether private or public schools are more cost-
effective, with studies presenting conflicting conclusions ‘using against each other arguments 
of biased approaches and inaccurate comparisons’.  
 
An important reason why low-budget private schools (as well as NGO schools) can operate at 
lower costs than government schools is because of possibilities of paying lower teacher 
salaries, which usually comprise a significant proportion of the recurrent education budget 
(with teachers often employed on temporary contracts). Tooley (2001) notes that, on average, 
teachers in private schools visited in India earned significantly less (between $9.50 to $119) 
than their counterparts in state schools (varying from $95 to $200) although both sets of 
teachers are generally qualified. In addition, his evidence suggests that teachers are more 
likely to be absent from state schools than private ones. He proposes that lower teacher 
salaries is an important reason for lower costs in these schools, while quality is maintained as 
a result of low pupil-teacher ratios (between 22:1 and 35:1), below that in government 
schools. High levels of teacher absenteeism observed in government schools could, however, 
be caused by the existence of private schools. In some countries, where private schools exist 
alongside government schools, teachers could choose to teach in private schools in order to 
supplement their government salary. In addition, teacher conditions of service in private 
schools are often less secure, with teachers employed on short-term, temporary contracts. On 
the one hand, this is put forward as an argument to support private schooling as it is suggested 
that it results in more committed teachers. On the other hand, it raises concerns that teachers 
are likely to be ‘motivated’ by fear of losing their jobs, and is also not sustainable as cadres of 
lower paid teachers are likely to unionise to demand improved conditions of service (as has 
happened with teachers in RNGPSs in Bangladesh). 
 
The few studies available examining the relative efficiency and cost-effectiveness of private 
and public schooling mainly refer to secondary schools, and usually do not differentiate 
between different types of private schools (i.e. ones serving the elite as opposed to low budget 
schools) (see, for example, Lockheed and Jimenez, 1994). More recent evidence in Tanzania, 
suggests that public secondary schools do perform better on average than their private sector 
counterparts (Lassibille, Tan and Sumra, 2000). An important reason for higher performance 
in government secondary schools at this level is due to the selection process. These studies 
indicate that students do not have a choice between different types of service providers, but 
rather their only option will be to go to private school if they do not get a place in a better 
quality government school (although quotas exist by region and gender). A study by Lassibille 
and Tan (1999) is a rare example of an attempt to measure cost-effectiveness based on 
disaggregation of different types of private schools. They find that performance deficits in 
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private schools persist even controlling for school inputs, suggesting that the private schools 
are actually less efficient than government schools. They recognise that this contradicts earlier 
evidence from Tanzania and elsewhere which suggested that private schools were more cost-
efficient and effective than public schools (Cox and Jimenez, 1990; Lockheed and Jimenez, 
1994; James, 1993), implying that the new generation of low-budget private schools which 
are emerging to fill the gap in the market could be at the expense of equity, quality and 
achievement. As these studies highlight, it is important to explore complex issues of the 
relative cost-effectiveness of private and public schools in more detail, with similar 
approaches needed for gaining an improved understanding with respect to primary schooling. 
 
It is also often suggested that NGO provision is more cost-effective but evidence is limited. 
Evidence that is presented usually does not include costs of monitoring, administration etc. 
(which is included in government costs). Given that these forms of support are often an 
important reason for their success, it is necessary to include such costs in order to consider 
possibilities of scaling up and replication. Tietjen (1999) offers a rare attempt at assessing 
cost-effectiveness of NGO education provision, although she recognises gaps in information 
on some aspects of their costs. She concludes that, while they have a range of benefits, NGO 
provision cannot necessarily be considered a cheap alternative to the state system as often 
claimed. In Bangladesh, for example, it is suggested that BRAC’s success is more to do with 
its efficient administration, rather than the role that the community plays (Bray, 2000). Even 
so, it is important to note that, since NGOs target the most hard-to-reach, they are likely to 
face high marginal costs given the need to work under difficult conditions in areas where 
other forms of infrastructure (such as roads) may not be available. In general, even where 
costs are lower in NSPs, there is a need to examine the reasons for cost differences, and 
whether lower costs could be sustained, or higher costs maintained, when provision is scaled-
up. 
3.4 Accountability 
Tooley (2001) presents evidence from the Public Report on Basic Education in India 
(PROBE) that the quality of education is higher in private schools because of the 
accountability of private schools to parents. While it is undeniable that accountability is 
important, whether this can only be attained through the private sector, or why it would be 
more apparent in a situation where a properly functioning market is not evident (as in 
education), is debatable. The World Bank, for example, proposes that attempts can be made to 
promote accountability within fee-free government provision through improved community-
school relations (World Bank, 2005). Even so, community involvement in schooling can be 
problematic, as it is often the voices of the most powerful in a community which are heard. 
Evidence from Malawi indicates, for example, that emphasis on community involvement can 
reinforce gender divisions of labour where women are expected to undertake unpaid work for 
the school (for example, carrying water), while men are involved in management committees, 
or are paid for school construction work etc (Rose, 2003a). This raises questions of who 
schools are accountable to within a community. 
  
A distinctive feature of NGO-run schools, such as BRAC and its replicas, is attention to 
encouraging different forms of community participation, with the intention of promoting local 
accountability. Emphasis is often placed on involving the community in improving the quality 
of education in schools by involving them in decision-making processes and management of 
schools, including with respect to recruitment of teachers, monitoring of teacher and student 
attendance, modification of curriculum (including fewer, more relevant subjects, and choice 
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of language), etc. The close relationship between communities and schools is generally 
considered to be a key aspect of the success of these schools. 
 
In Malawi, SCF-US encouraged community roles with respect to recruitment of teachers, 
discipline of teachers with regard to punctuality and performance, attendance and discipline of 
students, and timetabling (Dowd, 1997).  As a result, communities and school committees 
from the Village-based Schools were observed to perform more diverse roles than school 
committees in government schools, most of which were dysfunctional. The role of school 
management committees in monitoring and following up on absenteeism in Village-based 
Schools is reported to have reduced dropout rates, particularly for girls. However, the 
evidence indicates that once SCF-US became less involved in the programme, community 
involvement was not sustained, in part due to the absence of local NGOs to support this. 
Malawi’s experience indicates that community involvement in contexts where civil society 
capacity is weak requires sustained external facilitation and support and, even then, could be a 
burden for poor communities (Kadzamira and Rose, 2005).  
 
Local accountability is particularly key where schools themselves have been established by 
the community, as in the case of RNGPS in Bangladesh. Although the ‘community’ is 
supposed to initiate the establishment of a non-government school through a demand-driven 
process, it appears that the initiative often does not come from parents in the community but 
rather from unemployed youth and/or local politicians. The main difference between 
government and non-government schools relates to their governance – management of 
RNGPS is decentralised to the school level including with respect to teacher recruitment, 
while management of government schools is highly centralised  - recruitment of teachers 
being undertaken by the Ministry of Education. In practice, appointment of teachers in 
RNGPS occurs as a result of local patronage rather than following procedures of recruitment 
through school management committees, as intended. Given the dominance of local leaders in 
these decisions, decentralisation to the school level does not result in greater accountability to 
clients, or increased voice of the poor in decision-making, in practice (Chowdhury and Rose, 
2005). Furthermore, there is concern that reliance on community involvement in RNGPS can 
result in demands placed on poorer communities which already lack capacity, and which do 
not have the power to prevent elite capture (World Bank, 2002d). 
3.5 Quality 
Problems of quality of education in state schools are again a common concern in the majority 
of the countries under study. An important reason for the selection of private schools by 
parents is the search for better quality of education in the light of concern for deteriorating 
standards in government schools as a result of expansion in enrolment. As noted, in some 
African countries, the removal of primary tuition fees has resulted in significant increases in 
enrolment putting further pressure on already limited government resources for education. 
This has been accompanied by a growth in parents who are concerned with government 
school quality, paying for their children to enrol in private schools in urban areas in particular. 
In Uganda, in tests administered to national random samples of 3rd grade pupils, the number 
of pupils who achieved a satisfactory score declined from 48 percent in 1996 to 31 percent in 
1999 on the mathematics test, and from 92 percent to 56 percent in English oral test (World 
Bank, 2002b). In Malawi, only seven percent of those taking an achievement test at grade five 
in 1995 (a year after the fee abolition) showed attainment of basic competencies for that level 
(UNESCO, 2004).  
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In this context, arguments are put forward that private schooling can offer better quality as a 
result of competition and the need to be accountable to those paying for the service. As 
mentioned, quality may be defined in many different ways in the context of education. 
Arguments in favour of private provision tend to focus on perceptions of quality, and 
evidence of learning outcomes in terms of academic achievement. With respect to perceptions 
of quality, in India and Pakistan, many parents seem to have given up on government schools, 
although authors question the basis for parental perceptions of better quality in private 
schools, and argue that going to a private school is more of a mark of social privilege (Khan et 
al., 2003; De et al., 2002 – Box 4) – an issue also raised in many other contexts. 
 
Box 4  Perceptions of private school ‘quality’’ in Pakistan and India 
 
‘Private schools [in Pakistan] were often able to get away with poor performance because 
relatively uneducated parents had only abysmal government schooling to compare with 
private schooling. Indeed, much of the discussion of focus group meetings with parents whose 
children were in NGO and private schools centered on the disastrous state of government 
schooling. Many put their children in private school as much from a vague sense of doing best 
by their child as for the status symbol this has come to represent. More disturbing, poor 
parents sometimes judged quality by the fee they were paying.’ 
 
‘Parents [in India] face a difficult choice between low quality and no quality at primary level - 
and the enrolment in the new schools is mainly at this level. Government schools could be 
absent (urban areas), or dysfunctional (rural Rampur), or just casual. Parents often helplessly 
observe while their child struggles through government primary schools and after two or three 
years of such struggle they put him in a nursery class of a (possibly low quality) private 
school out of desperation. Often the government school parents have little idea that their child 
has not learned much. There were, however, also cases where the parents were disillusioned 
with private schools and moved helplessly from one to the other and even went back to the 
government school.  
 
(Sources: Cited from Khan et al., 2003; De et al., 2002). 
  
In Malawi and Nigeria, perceptions of quality by parents influencing their demand for private 
schools include tuition in English, evidence of discipline of both pupils and teachers, and 
smaller class size. Proprietors stated that, since they are concerned about ensuring that they 
receive a return on their investment, they monitor the teachers closely. If teachers are not 
performing (including if they are found not to be teaching in English), proprietors commented 
that they would sack them. This is possible, given that, unlike in government schools, teachers 
in private schools do not have permanent contracts, and are often hired on a piecework basis. 
In addition, proprietors suggested that, unlike governments schools, their schools are not 
affected by teacher absenteeism due to strikes or moonlighting. Proprietors also claimed that 
pupil discipline is better in private schools, in part because of smaller class size making it 
more manageable for teachers to maintain control in the classroom (with often less than 30 in 
a classroom, compared with over 100 in government schools). In addition, in some situations, 
teachers are on the premises in these schools until late hours, so that it serves as a childcare 
centre after school finishes, which is particularly beneficial where both parents are working 
which is most evident in urban areas, where women work as market traders, for example. As 
elsewhere, there is little, if any, evidence on the performance of private provision in these 
countries, although there are concerns that some of these schools operate in unsuitable 
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facilities (in former bars or houses, for example), with unqualified teachers who are preferred 
by proprietors as they are cheaper to recruit (Adelabu and Rose, 2005; Kadzamira and Rose, 
2005). 
 
Focusing on learning outcomes, some evidence indicates that academic performance is higher 
compared with that in neighbouring government schools for those able to gain access to 
private schools (Tooley, 2005). While this is used to suggest that quality is better in these 
schools, this focuses on academic achievement (which is usually the main concern of the 
private schools), and does not include a holistic understanding of quality with respect to other 
learning outcomes that might be desirable (eg critical thinking, influencing of attitudes, values 
and practices etc). This is not to say that these outcomes are apparent in government schools 
either, and evidence also indicates that private schools may perform better in terms of teacher 
attendance etc. (Tooley, 2005). However, it also does not mean that the EFA goal has been 
satisfactorily been met. 
 
Performance of children in NGO schools is reported to be at least as good as in government 
schools in these countries (CAMPE 1999; Hyde et al 1996; Dowd 1997; Miske and Dowd 
1998; National Rural Support Programme, 2004). In general, the average length of NGO 
programmes (including BRAC’s) is three years, raising concern of whether children can 
achieve sustainable basic literacy and numeracy in this limited time. This is evident in 
Bangladesh, where adult literacy rates have remained consistently low, despite efforts of 
BRAC over the past 20 years.9 One issue that arises from BRAC’s own studies relates to 
problems students face when transferring from NGO programmes to formal government 
secondary schools. Graduates from BRAC programmes are allowed to continue their 
education in these schools although some other NGO programmes are not recognised in this 
respect given the lack of an equivalency system. Even so, those from BRAC programmes 
often face difficulties as they are not prepared for the different teaching and learning styles 
and, therefore, may dropout (Nath, 2002). 
 
With respect to spontaneous community schools in Bangladesh, qualifications of teachers and 
physical facilities are generally worse in RNGPS compared with government primary schools 
(Asian Development Bank, 2003; CAMPE, 2001). Despite this, studies indicate that the 
achievement of basic competencies, which is low overall in the country, tend to be higher on 
average in RNGPS compared with government primary schools (Asian Development Bank, 
2003; CAMPE 1999; CAMPE 2000).  
3.6 Equity 
Considerations of ‘quality’ and ‘relevance’ in comparing government and NSPs do not often 
extend to attention to broader processes and outcomes from learning (including with respect 
to the hidden curriculum which can reproduce inequalities through schooling). These are 
likely to give rise to equity issues – both in terms of access, as well as with respect to post-
schooling outcomes. 
 
Equity is probably the most important argument used against NSPs in primary schooling. 
Despite evidence that private fee-charging schools vary in fee-structure, with low-budget 
schools catering to the poor, most studies acknowledge that they do not reach to the ‘extreme’ 
or ultra-poor. Given the massive increase in enrolment in response to fee abolition in many 
                                                 
9 There are, however, no evaluations of the outcomes from BRAC programmes in terms of sustained literacy or 
livelihood opportunities. 
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countries, this would suggest that the extreme poor would be unable to afford the fees of 
private for-profit schools. Evidence suggests that even relatively informal unregistered 
schools are likely to be beyond the reach of the poorest, many of whom reside in rural areas 
(Lewin and Sayed, 2005; Rose, 2005b; Lewin and Akyeampong, 2005). For example, even 
relatively modest fees of $3 per month cited by proprietors of private schools in Malawi are 
likely to be beyond the reach of the poor (even before other costs of education are taken into 
account), as this would comprise over one-third of resources available per person in a 
household for the 65% of the population below the poverty line (Kadzamira and Rose, 2005). 
A study looking at six locations in educationally disadvantaged districts in India shows that 
costs remain an excluding factor for private schooling. The extreme poor are dependent on 
government schools and can generally access only the government primary schools seen to be 
the worst in the sector (De et al, 2002). According to a recent Census of Private Schools 
(2000), Pakistan has as many as 40,000 of such private schools, which are mainly a result of 
significant growth in private schooling over the 1990s (World Bank, 2002a). The increases 
were distributed across the all expenditure deciles though most pronounced in the higher 
income groups, with private share in primary enrollment growing from 5 to 10 percent for the 
lowest decile and from 35 to 60 percent for the highest decile (World Bank, 2002a).  
 
Even so, government schools are not always cheaper for the poor despite being fee-free. 
Government schools also include many indirect costs, which can be significant for the poor. 
Sometimes community schools end up being cheaper and thus a more viable option for poor 
when the indirect costs are taken into count. In Zambia, the government has made education 
free in all its schools but some state schools still turn away students whose families cannot 
afford uniforms, books or fee of Parent Teacher Associations. Parents working on sugar 
plantations say that they choose the private school because it is more practical and cheaper for 
them to pay its 62 pence monthly fee than to send their children to the nearest state funded 
school 10 kilometres away (Ngalati, 2006). 
 
Even proponents of private education generally acknowledge potential adverse equity effects, 
since better quality private schools will tend to attract children from better socio-economic 
backgrounds, whose parents can afford to pay fees, and perceived social status of attending 
such schools is likely to provide a signal to future employers. However, proponents consider 
that the benefits of competition can be balanced with bursaries to support the ‘deserving but 
needy’, at the same time as freeing up scarce government resources for public schooling. 
Tooley (2005) provides evidence that some private providers themselves provide such 
bursaries – although it is doubtful that they could operate if coverage of these were to extend 
to the vast majority of populations in low-income countries who are below the poverty line. 
Colclough (1996) suggests that, while evidence may not be strong enough to suggest 
privatising existing public sector schools, in countries which are resource-constrained and 
where excess demand for education remains high, allowing the private sector to meet part of 
that demand could result in increased levels of enrolment in schools of adequate quality, at no 
direct cost to the poor (provided government provision is maintained). 
 
In addition, where the middle classes (and now even low-income families) send their children 
to private schools, they could be inclined to vote for low-cost, low-quality public schooling 
(James, 1997, cited in Peano, 1997). This is likely to exacerbate a two-tier system – with those 
able to afford to opt out less willing to pay taxes to support improvements in those ‘left 
behind’ in government schools. Certainly, one reason put forward for parental choice of 
private schools is with respect to their perceived status. An unanswered question is whether 
children now attending private schools were those who were previously enrolled in fee-
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charging government schools (it would seem unlikely that those previously out of school 
partly because of inability to pay government school fees would now enrol in fee-charging 
private schools). While their movement to private schools could have freed up some space in 
overcrowded government schools, the motivation for the choice of private schools could be to 
maintain social differentiation (that previously existed when they attended government 
schools, while those from lower social strata remained out of school). This requires 
exploration of the educational trajectories of those now attending private schools. 
 
Despite international attention given to the promotion of gender equality in education, very 
little analysis of gender implications of private education is available. There is, however, 
some evidence of private schools being allowed to operate on the grounds that they are 
catering for girls who are underserved by the system while, in practice, boys are attending 
these schools (partly due to low demand for girls’ education) (Jha and Subrahmanian, 2004). 
 
With respect to private tuition, Bray (2003) highlights that among the most problematic cases 
are where teachers are employed in state schools but give private tutoring to those pupils able 
to pay in the same subjects and sometimes even in the same classrooms. This provides an 
incentive for teachers to under-teach during official school hours, as an enticement to parents 
to pay for tuition to ensure children cover the curriculum required to pass examinations thus 
advantaging children from better-off households.  Private tuition is sometimes illegal, but 
restrictions are not easy to enforce. 
 
Given the importance of certification for gaining access to particular kinds of jobs, 
involvement in non-formal NGO provision might not facilitate such opportunities. There is 
extremely limited information comparing opportunities available to children from different 
types of schooling, with concern that different forms of provision could be reinforcing 
inequalities beyond schooling rather than offering possibilities for social mobility (Rose and 
Dyer, 2006).  
3.7 Innovation 
An important aspect of NGO provision is often its intention to pilot innovative practices on a 
small scale, with the intention that lessons can be learnt for government provision, rather than 
necessarily scaled up by NGOs themselves. In Malawi, for example, it is argued that SCF-US 
supported NGO provision played an important role in the formulation of the National Strategy 
for Community Participation in Primary School Management, which has been devised by 
CARE Malawi with support from DFID and in collaboration with Ministry of Education 
(MIM and IPRAD, 2004). 
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4. State Purchase of Basic Services 
While there is an increased focus on possibilities for state purchase of basic education 
services, in practice, there are very few examples in low-income countries of formal 
contracting of education service delivery by government to NSPs (LaRocque, 2005; Patrinos, 
2005). Government contracting of NSPs is more evident in infrastructure services contracts 
and professional services (such as production of textbooks) to support inputs, than through 
formal arrangements to support the process or output of education services (Table 5). This is 
perhaps not surprising given the need for ‘an enabling policy and regulatory environment and 
a strong legal framework’ (LaRocque, 2005: 36) which, as noted below, is not generally 
apparent in such countries. This is reinforced by government commitment (including through 
legislation) in many countries to provide education, which means that while governments are 
willing to tolerate NSPs, they may be less keen to be seen to be explicitly encouraging it, as 
this may be interpreted by its electorate as abdicating responsibility. 
Table 5 Typology of contracting in education 
Contracting form Description Contract types 
Auxiliary/professional 
services - input 
Government contracts to the 
private sector to undertake 
education related functions 
eg inspection, curriculum 
development etc 
Auxiliary/professional 
services contract (eg for 
curriculum design) 
Infrastructure – input  Government contracts private 
sector to design, build, 
finance  educational 
infrastructure, such as 
classrooms and hostels 
Infrastructure services 
contract 
Operational services - 
process 
Government contracts with a 
private provider to operate an 
existing public service using 
public infrastructure 
Operational contracts 
Management - process 
 
Government contracts with 
the private sector to manage 
an existing public service 
using public infrastructure 
Management contracts 
 
Education services delivery – 
output 
Government buys student 
places in private schools 
(contracts with schools to 
enrol specific students) 
 
Government contracts with a 
private provider to deliver a 
specified service/set of 
services using private 
infrastructure 





Service delivery contract 
 
(Source: Adapted from LaRocque, 2005; and Patrinos, 2005). 
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There is some experience of government contracting education service delivery to hard-to-
reach groups through formal arrangements with NGOs. This most often occurs where donor 
resources are being provided for such support, with decisions made to channel these through 
government rather than supporting NGOs directly. It occurs in particular when donors are 
concerned about undermining the legitimacy of the state, and wants to support its state-
building, where they recognise that the state has the political will but not the capacity to 
provide. Such contractual arrangements have, however, themselves suffered from problems 
encountered with state capacity, as examples from Bangladesh and Pakistan illustrate.  
 
During the 1980s, Bangladesh had short-lived experience of government contracting of 
NGOs, the funding for which primarily was provided by international donors. Initially, some 
well-resourced NGOs felt this arrangement would be beneficial, both because it would enable 
them to influence policy from within, and also to have access to alternative sources of funding 
(Miwa, 2003). However, difficulties in contractual arrangements, including inefficient and 
untransparent procedures, tended to stifle innovation and reduce NGO flexibility and 
responsiveness to local needs. Some NGOs also felt uncomfortable with competitive bidding 
as it was felt that this encouraged a business approach to education (Cummings et al., 2004). 
In addition, the process of selection of NGOs resulted in the contracting of some ‘briefcase’ 
NGOs, established by former civil servants with the aim of obtaining funds rather than for the 
purpose of providing education (Miwa, 2003).  
 
Similarly, in Pakistan, the Social Action Programme (SAP) was a major multi-sectoral 
programme designed by all the major donors, including the World Bank, UN System, ADB, 
and the Governments of Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Japan and the USA in collaboration 
with the government of Pakistan. Though managed by the government, one of the key 
conditions of the programme set by the donor community was ensuring involvement of NGOs 
and private sector in the delivery of the projects. The government had to contract a set number 
of projects through NGOs. While this resulted in the development of a large number of 
‘community’ schools in a relatively short period of time (Harlech-Jones et al, 2005), the 
programme proved a failure primarily due to major corruption issues on the government side. 
 
In the Punjab, Pakistan, two versions of ‘public-private partnerships’ have been established in 
the recent climate of donors’ support in developing such partnerships in recognition of 
improved state will but weak capacity. These public-private partnerships are a relatively 
recent phenomenon and was heavily promoted by the first Federal Minister for Education 
under General Musharraf’s rule from 2000 onwards, who herself came from an NGO 
background. Most of her advisors were also from NGOs and the donors worked very closely 
with this team. In the first example, under-used and dilapidated government school buildings 
are being leased to private schools for an afternoon shift. The scheme was designed because 
government schools were deemed to be under-performing due to poor public management, 
and inadequate teachers and equipment. The private school cannot directly compete with 
government provision in the morning shift - it has to offer education in the next higher grade, 
or to provide other types of education such as computer and English language classes. The 
private provider has to upgrade the facilities of the government school, pay all utility bills for 
both public and private provision, contribute to other operating costs, and pay 10 percent of 
any profits to the government school council. The private provider may charge a fee for the 
afternoon school according to a schedule agreed with government (with a ceiling for primary 
schools of Rs 200 - £2). This has improved diversity of provision, and access to higher levels. 
However, tensions have arisen as private providers feel that financial demands placed on them 
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are onerous, raising criticisms that ‘partnership’ is resulting in extraction rather than 
facilitation (Hossain and Batley, 2005).  
 
Second, a local philanthropic association in Lahore (CARE) has taken responsibility for 
running and managing government schools, with arrangements agreed through a 
memorandum of understanding with the government although roles and responsibilities have 
not been sufficiently clearly specified. Funds from individual and corporate local donors have 
been used to rehabilitate buildings and equipment, to install water and sanitation, to manage 
the schools, to supply additional (private) teachers, and to undertake training for all teachers. 
CARE does not, however, have direct administrative control of government teachers who 
continue to be paid by the provincial government, and who have resisted the perceived 
challenge to their status, resulting in some tension with the non-state provider. Even so, the 
partnership is reported to have been successful in significantly increasing enrolment and 
reducing teacher absenteeism (Hossain and Batley, 2005). A concern arising from this is that, 
as government has passed over control it has also enabled it to relinquish responsibility. Since 
a national ban has been placed on recruitment of new teachers, government teachers working 
within the CARE schools are not replaced when they retire. As a result CARE has to hire new 
teachers for replacement on its own budget. This raises issues of sustainability of such 
partnerships. 
 
Patrinos (2005) on typology of contracting of education services includes state subsidisation 
of NSPs through vouchers, scholarships etc. allowing choice between attending private or 
government schools, as well as subsidisation of private schools – such subsidisation may be 
explicit, or more indirect. These types of arrangements may involve more informal contractual 
arrangements. Examples of this form of support of NSP are more prevalent where states have 
both strong capacity and strong will within a neo-liberal perspective, so do not necessarily see 
the state as directly responsible for service delivery, even though they are responsible for 
ensuring all children have access to some form of schooling. Where such forms of 
government support are evident, it is likely that the private sector will play a greater role in 
service delivery. UNESCO’s World Education Indicators Report notes that, in the (mainly 
middle-income) countries included in the survey, with the exception of Jordan, countries in 
which 20 percent or more of primary and secondary students were enrolled in private 
institutions, public authorities supported the cost of education of these students through 
education vouchers, tax exemptions, and other forms of subsidies, although the amount 
transferred was below what their share of enrolment might suggest (UNESCO, 2005b).  
 
Given that non-state provision has largely been occurring by default in low-income countries, 
there are more limited examples of explicit facilitation by the state, although in all cases non-
state schools receive indirect support from the government in terms of curriculum design, 
often training of teachers, and sometimes textbook provision. However, as the following 
examples from the NSP case studies indicate, these financing arrangements, resulting in the 
blurring of boundaries between government and NSPs, can create tensions with other aspects 
of their engagement with government which have the intention of supporting an enabling 
environment. Thus, while such facilitation can support access, it can be either inadequate or 
inappropriate to support pro-poor provision on a sustainable basis without paying 
simultaneous attention to this environment. 
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South Africa provides an example of a relatively strong state committed to its own provision 
with the ability and desire to control the private sector. Where the private sector does exist, 
the government does, however, provide support to ensure its commitment to pro-poor service 
delivery. Throughout legislation there are clauses which place responsibilities on the state to 
support non-profit service providers in particular through the provision of subsidies. However, 
particularly in low budget private schools which are most dependent on the subsidies, slow 
disbursement and sometimes inaccurate calculations can result in teachers not being paid 
(Motimele and Lewin, 2004). More generally, procedures designed to ensure accountability 
for public funds have been criticised as often cumbersome, having high transaction costs, and 
creating compliance difficulties for smaller organisations (Gardiner and Macanda, 2003). In 
addition, while the intention is that the subsidies are progressive (the lower their fees, the 
proportionally higher their subsidies), they are considered inadequate by low budget private 
primary schools. Furthermore, in order to access state subsidies, schools have to be registered 
as not-for-profit organisations. This prevents owners and shareholders benefiting from their 
investments in schools since they cannot draw profits, and can only reinvest gains. This 
arguably undermines incentives to be more efficient and effective. By contrast, schools 
previously serving relatively wealthy white communities which chose to remain in the state 
system after the end of apartheid also receive fee income which can be as high as those 
charged by independent schools, but have salaries paid by the government which is more 
beneficial than the subsidies received by independent schools (Motimele and Lewin, 2004). 
Overall, such facilitation offered creates little incentive for growth in non-state provision 
especially at the low cost end while, as noted below, has led to tensions with respect to policy 
dialogue. 
 
In Bangladesh, after completing the process of registration, RNGPS receive government 
funding through both supply- and demand-side interventions including construction and 
maintenance of school buildings, training of teachers, payment of 90 percent of teacher 
salaries, provision of free textbooks, and inclusion of eligible students in the government’s 
primary education stipend programme targeted at poor students. As such, once registered, 
there is a blurring of boundaries between government and non-state provision, although in 
practice RNGPS do not receive the same level of support as government schools. Facilitation 
of RNGPS is closely linked to regulation which, as noted below, has resulted in conflict. 
Alternatively, the lack of ‘facilitation’ of NGO providers in Bangladesh could help to explain 
the reported success of the programmes reaching the poor as, unlike RNGPS, they have been 
able to operate relatively free of government interference (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005).  
 
As mentioned, the design of the Community Supported Rural Schools Programme (CSRSP) 
in Pakistan resembles BRAC schools in Bangladesh, the difference being that CSRSP schools 
receive financial support through loans from the National Education Foundation (NEF). While 
these were initially sufficient to enable schools to operate, a fall in interest rates and rising 
salaries resulted in the endowment becoming inadequate to cover their costs. In order to make 
the schools sustainable, NEF declared that each school should start a savings programme, 
implying that they would need to make a profit. At the end of an initial period, NEF would 
then give a grant equivalent to each school’s savings. Not all schools are, however, able to 
achieve this self-sufficiency, particularly those in more deprived rural areas (Hossain and 
Batley, 2005).  
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Overall, examples of state purchase of NSP range from formal contracts in supporting ‘public-
private partnerships’ with respect to sharing responsibilities in infrastructure, management 
etc., to less direct forms of facilitation through different forms of subsidisation (usually 
requiring registration of NSPs). The evidence indicates that these arrangements can support 
improved processes of schooling and/or increase access, although tensions underlying the 
relationship between governments and NSPs are evident. This may be particularly apparent 
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5. Donors Working Directly with NSPs  
In the majority of the DFID priority countries, international donors and INGOs have an 
important influence in the shaping of the education sector. In many cases, donors fund a 
significant portion of the education budgets - 54 percent of the Ugandan primary recurrent 
education budget is externally funded; and with 43 percent in Zambia (UNESCO, 2005a). In 
cases where donors are heavily involved in financing, it is also likely that they will have an 
influence over the shape and direction of education policy and plans, including with respect to 
support for NSPs (Samoff, 1993). In terms of donor direct support to NSPs, they most 
commonly work directly with international and national NGOs rather than with other 
providers in education service delivery. In some cases, such NGOs are created with the 
intention of acquiring such funding (Edwards and Hulme, 1995). However, in general, donors 
are more reticient about suggesting that governments can and should withdraw from direct 
provision of education services compared with other sectors (Wakefield, 2004). Reasons for 
this could be associated with recognition of the role education plays in national identity 
formation and social mobility, as well as the scale of the sector given that often as much as 
one-fifth of government budgets are allocated to recurrent education costs, an important part 
of which is teacher salaries. The feasibility of NSPs taking over this role on a large scale is 
likely to be constrained by the existence of a sizeable middle class able to run NGOs and/or 
private schools. 
 
International donors commonly work in three modes with local NGOs. One, they provide 
funds directly to a local NGO (for example, BRAC). Two, they provide funds to an INGO 
who in turn works through local NGOs (for example, education projects implemented by Save 
the Children-US in Malawi). Three, donors finance projects through the government but make 
it compulsory to involve NGOs in the delivery of the project (see contracting above). Donors 
are most likely to support the first type where there is low political will and/or capacity of 
states to manage contracts as noted above, but civil society capacity exists; and the second 
form where there is low political will along with low civil society capacity (likely to be 
particularly evident in areas of conflict and fragile states). The approach used may also 
depend on the orientation of donors, with USAID generally favouring an approach of working 
directly with NGOs, while others, including those in the OECD DAC group supporting fragile 
states, taking a more cautious approach – with concern of the tension between supporting 
service delivery in the short term and longer term state building (OECD DAC, 2005). There 
are examples of donors working directly with NGOs in most DFID priority countries. 
However, no data exists to indicate the amount of donor funding channelled through this 
route, rather than through government – either to support government programmes, or NSPs.  
 
A USAID study of education sector in four sub-Saharan African countries argues that 
international NGOs tend to define, more than national ones, the kind of NGO programmes 
that exist within a country—a result of the much larger resource base on which many 
international NGOs rely. The study also argues that international NGO programmes tend to 
influence one another across countries thus leading to similarity of programmes across the 
different countries (Miller-Grandvaux et al, 2002). The study further adds that in all these 
countries, international NGOs have been at the forefront of trying to influence national 
education policy or the national education policy process. NGOs such as Pact, Action Aid and 
Save the Children sit with the MOE on selected task forces to join in these discussions. 
However, as Colenso (2005) points out, it is not apparent why foreign-funded NGOs of these 
kinds have either the experience or legitimacy to be involved in government-led policy and 
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planning processes – which could be seen as an indirect way for donors to influence the 
agenda in a context where donors are supporting country-led processes. 
 
BRAC’s success is partly due to its size and influence which has enabled it to build a 
relationship with the government on its terms. As such, BRAC’s capacity to perform its role is 
probably stronger than the state’s ability to regulate it. However, this is not the case for most 
other, smaller, NGOs. BRAC’s capacity is, however, heavily dependent on external donor 
funds. Given its size and influence, White (1999: 321) suggests ‘the scale of some donor 
commitments to BRAC mean that a break down in the relationship would be as much a 
disaster for the donor as it would be for BRAC itself’ suggesting that this is unlikely to 
change for the time being. 
 
Direct donor support to international NGOs may be the preferred route for donor funds in 
fragile states particularly where there is concern that support to state capacity for service 
delivery could legitimise an unwilling regime, or where there is a need to act fast in the 
context of low state capacity and low levels of provision. However, there is also concern that 
support to non-state service delivery would de-legitimise or incapacitate the state. Where 
‘early recovery’ is deemed to be underway preference is, therefore, given to strengthening 
state capacity for sustainable provision in the long term (Meagher, 2005). As experience of 
Sudan indicates, countries moving between different phases of fragility are likely to encounter 
different forms of support from donors – with, at points, concern for education service 
delivery while attempting to avoid being seen as supporting rebel movements, to working 
with government as peace treaties appear to have some effect – although continuing to 
channel most support through NGOs in order to ensure short-term results (Box 5).  
Box 5 Donor support for NGO provision in a fragile state – experience from Sudan 
 
Due to poor record of the Sudanese government on safeguarding human rights, during the 
1990s the majority of international and bi-lateral donors were unwilling to support education 
in southern Sudan. There were a few exceptions. The Norwegian Government, for example, 
provided support through UNICEF and through NGOs such as Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Africa Educational Trust (AET). 
 
UNICEF was the agency which provided the largest amount of support throughout the 
nineties.  It provided educational materials for primary schools and supported in-service 
training of primary teachers throughout the South.  ACROSS [NGO] participated in in-service 
training and through its Sudan Literature Centre (SLC) produced primary school textbooks 
and teacher’s guides.  Other organizations tended to concentrate on in-service training and the 
provision of school materials and supplies within specific defined geographic areas. NCA, for 
example, supported teacher training and schools in Eastern Equatoria.  International Aid 
Sweden (IAS) and NSCC did this in Western Equatoria.  Similarly SCF (Sweden) worked in 
lower Bar El Ghazal and SCF(UK) in Central Upper Nile and Northern Bar El Ghazal. The 
zonal approach continued to be the pattern for the involvement of most international agencies 
throughout the 1990s.  In 2002 UNICEF while continuing to provide across the south also 
decided to concentrate or give funding priority for work in two counties (Rumbek and 
Yambio). Since 1996 a few smaller organizations, such as AET have worked across the 
different regions but on limited and more specific areas of work such as baseline data 
collection and training of head teachers and parent teacher associations.  
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During the 1990s, often out of necessity, UNICEF and most other international agencies and 
NGOs worked on a day-to-day basis with representatives of the different southern movements 
such as SPLM/SRRA, RASS and FRRA. However, due to pressure from funders especially 
bi-lateral government agencies and the need for maintaining neutrality very little support was 
provided for the education departments or sections of these different movements. At times this 
has led to a concern about the possibility of incompatible programmes and systems being 
established within the areas which fell under the spheres of influence of different NGOs.  For 
example, with schools following different curricula and textbooks from different countries 
such as Kenya and Uganda. 
 
The talks leading to, and the signing of, the Machakos Protocol in 2003 have helped to bring 
about a major shift of policy by international donors and agencies.  USAID has already 
committed US$20 million over a five year period for the “Sudan Basic Education Program”. 
The main goal of this project, which is being managed by CARE is to increase equitable 
access to quality education. To achieve this the programme plans to support the establishment 
of four regional teacher training institutes, train 2,000 women teachers, rehabilitate 300 
schools, provide non-formal education for 16,000 learners and increase the supply of school 
materials. (USAID, 2002). 
 
In January 2003 the UK Department for International Development (DFID) made a grant of 
£2 million to UNICEF for the delivery of “quick impact” educational initiatives to the north 
and south of Sudan.  These initiatives are seen as being part of a “peace dividend” which will 
encourage the Government in the north and the SPLM in the south to continue to work 
together for a lasting solution to the war.  DFID has also indicated that the UK Government 
intends to provide substantial medium and long-term funding for education provided the 
peace process is sustained.  
 
The European Union is taking a similar approach to the UK and is planning a “quick 
response” three year Sudan Post-conflict Recovery and Rehabilitation (SPRR) Programme 
with Fifty million Euro of funding. The purpose of this programme is to “enhance 
opportunities for the rapid recovery of rural livelihoods at community/ local level” (EC, 
2003).  The EU programme will concentrate on eleven geographic areas some in the north and 
some in the south (Upper Nile, Western and Northern Bar El Ghazal, Lakes, Unity, Warab 
and Jongli) and implementation will be through consortia of NGOs. The two main focal areas 
identified for what is referred to as a multi-track response strategy are food security and 
education.  
 
(Source: Extracted from Brophy, 2003). 
 
Direct donor support may also be preferred to support specific areas of a country which are 
neglected by government, including in cases of internal conflict. In such circumstances, 
democratic systems may fail to meet the needs of minority groups. In Sri Lanka, for example, 
international NGO support, in conjunction with UN bodies, was important in providing 
‘neutral inputs’ amongst Tamil populations in the North and East of the country, in a context 
where the government education system more generally was considered robust and worthy of 
donor support for the rest of the country (Sibbons, 2005: 85). 
 
Issues arise not only of in what contexts education service delivery might benefit from donors 
working directly with NSPs, but also the aid modality adopted in such contexts to ensure 
expanded access to underserved groups in the short-term, whilst not undermining state 
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capacity for longer term sustainability. The EFA Fast-Track Initiative could provide an 
opportunity for providing a bridge between these, as proposed in the case of Sudan, through 
promoting ‘coherence and harmonisation between agencies; improve practical coordination 
mechanisms between actors; and help in the provision of long term support for education.’ 
(FTI, 2005). Alternatively, donors may work with UN agencies in contexts of fragility, with 
the aim of supporting longer-term state capacity for education service delivery. For example, 
DFID is working together with UNESCO and UNICEF to develop a 3-5 year strategic 
partnership for education in Somalia, to improve coordination in the sector, and move beyond 
a humanitarian response (FTI, 2005). 
 
In some cases, donor direct support to NGOs can create a tension with government. In 
Ethiopia, central government allocates a block grant to each region based on a formula. In an 
effort to promote equity in the region any funding brought into the region by an NGO (usually 
funded by donors) is supposed to be subtracted from the total amount sent to that region by 
the government. This can result in regional governments being reluctant to allow NGOs to 
operate in the region, as it means that the resources over which they have direct control is 
diminished (Miller-Grandvaux et al, 2002).  
 
With respect to different donor perspectives, DFID’s support for NSPs in education mainly 
focuses on NGO service delivery in fragile environments where the state is unable to provide 
adequate education opportunities in the short- to medium-term, and where conditions are such 
that there is concern that aid cannot be effectively absorbed through fragile state institutions. 
For DFID, the expectation continues to be, however, that provision will ultimately transfer to 
become the responsibility of the state and that its support will shift as the environment 
becomes less difficult. It is noted, for example, that, evidence suggests that aid absorption is 
four times higher in countries in the fourth year after the end of conflict compared with 
countries at peace. DFID has, therefore, shown a longer-term commitment to supporting 
governments in such situations – for example, a 10 year commitment to support Sierra Leone 
from 2002 (DFID, 2005). Sida works mainly with NSPs in conflict situations, and GTZ 
focuses on supporting NGOs in areas of countries under-served by the state (Wakefield, 
2004). 
 
In contrast, USAID has worked directly with NGOs as a means of bypassing government 
bureaucracies (Miller-Grandvaux et al, 2002). As the experience in Malawi illustrates, this 
raises important challenges for sustainability, and can potentially create some tension and 
conflict with government where it is felt to challenge or undermine its role (Kadzamira and 
Rose, 2005).10  
 
Despite intentions, it is very rare that the government takes over the responsibility for 
sustaining donor-supported NGO projects when the donors withdraw. As the case of BRAC 
illustrates, a shift from donor support of NSPs to government provision can prove difficult, as 
capacity is built outside the government making transfer of support problematic. Despite the 
long experience of NGOs ‘filling the gap’ in provision in Bangladesh and agreement by 
NGOs and government that their role should not be permanent, there is no evidence of a 
planned exit strategy. Rather, it appears that NGOs will continue to play an important role for 
                                                 
10 It has not been possible to undertake a systematic review of approaches by different donors towards support 
for NSPs based on programmes they are supporting within the available time, although this would be of 
relevance in understanding the extent to which coordination in different contexts is possible, particularly where 
donors are driven by different agendas. It would also be of relevance to obtain information from NGOs with 
regard to their strategies for working with donors, while not intending to undermine state capacity. 
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the foreseeable future as they receive further support through the recently agreed World Bank 
‘Reaching out of School Children’ programme. The recent development of BRAC acting as a 
sub-contractor of education services also suggests that, rather than having a planned strategy 
of withdrawal, there is seen to be a need for NGO provision for the foreseeable future. This 
provision appears to complement government provision through increased coverage in some 
areas of the country. A danger is, however, that a two-tier education system will become 
entrenched – with children in these areas dependent on the provision NGOs are able to offer 
which is more limited than the government’s in terms of length of the cycle and narrower 
range of subjects offered. In addition, donor-funded NGO provision could let the government 
off the hook of extending provision to under-served areas, as is evident by a lack of planned 
strategy to do so (NGO provision is absent from the Primary Education Development Plan II). 
 
In Pakistan, a survey of twenty of the most prominent NGOs in Pakistan shows that 14 were 
working on education mostly providing non-formal community-based schools (Bano, 2005). 
All the NGOs established these programmes with the intention of securing donor funds. None 
of these NGOs had plans to hand over schools to the government when donor support runs 
out. This could be indicative that no one expects the government to take on more 
responsibility, and also that those establishing NGOs would not want to relinquish control 
given they support their own livelihood as well as that of others in the community. In most 
cases the signs were that once the donor funding finished, the projects halted immediately and 
there was no follow-up.  
 
NGOs in South Africa provide interesting experience of sustainability in a changing political 
and economic climate. Following the end of apartheid, NGO providers had to decide whether 
to become more integrated into programmes initiated and controlled by the state, or to 
continue to seek funding outside government. As direct external funding of NSPs diminished, 
NGOs which did not make the transition to more commercial operations drawing on corporate 
sources of funding, have diminished (Motimele and Lewin, 2004). 
 
In other cases, the intended shift in fact occurs from donor support of NGOs towards a more 
private sector-oriented approach, with charging of fees from the parents when the donors 
withdraw. For example, Al-Fateh a small NGO in Bahawalpur, Southern Punjab Pakistan, is 
running a primary school with support of international donors. However, the school is 
supported for only three years. The plan is that during this time the parents will have to be 
encouraged to start paying fees. Neither the NGO nor the international donors are planning for 
the government to take over the school costs when the donors withdraw (Bano, 2005). 
 
With respect to private provision, there is more limited direct donor involvement. While the 
World Bank channelling of resources through a range of modalities is not generally 
specifically designed to support NSPs (Wakefield, 2004), the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) arm of the World Bank11 proposes that direct external support could be 
advantageous in helping to establish ‘conditions which will help edupreneurs minimize risks 
and increase the probability of being profitable’ (Karmokolias and van Lutsenburg Maas, 
1997: 20). Even so, their support is mainly directed at the secondary level, where the role of 
the private sector is less controversial. 
  
                                                 
11 See EdInvest – ‘Facilitating Investment in the Global Education Market’ - http://www.ifc.org/edinvest/ 
[accessed 27/10/2005] 
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While there is more limited evidence of donors directly supporting private providers, there are 
examples of private school networks supported by international donors in many countries – 
for example, the Private Schools Association of Malawi (PRISAM) is supported by the World 
Bank and British Council. 
 
Donors are most visible in direct support to NSPs in situations where the challenges of 
scaling-up of education services are particularly evident (including in fragile states where 
access is constrained, and the state has limited capacity, or in areas of countries underserved 
by the government system). For this provision to be sustainable, there is a recognised need for 
longer-term predictable funding given that the bulk of costs are allocated to teacher salaries so 
requiring regular sources of funding. In this context, there is a preference amongst most 
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6. Creating an Enabling Environment 
The section will be concerned with creating an enabling environment for NSPs intending to 
support access to underserved groups in particular and/or by the government aiming to ensure 
that NSPs provide support to these groups.  
 
It considers relationships between governments and the different types of NSPs with respect 
to policy dialogue, and regulation/quality assurance. While in principle these forms of 
engagement can support an enabling environment, it is important to consider circumstances 
under which this can be achieved. It is also apparent that NSPs themselves often initiate 
engagement with governments, particularly through the common voice of umbrella 
associations.  
6.1 Policy Dialogue 
The extent to which NSPs are recognised by government is influenced both by involvement of 
NSPs in policy dialogue, as well as the extent to which their contribution to service delivery is 
evident in national education plans. In India, the 1986 National Policy of Education 
formalised the role of NGOs in reaching hard-to-reach children, that it was recognised the 
state alone would not be able to cater for. This involved partnership between the state and 
NGOs, with the state responsible for overall management and planning, while NSPs were 
responsible for service delivery. This relationship has become even more emphatic in the most 
recent Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan policy framework. As in other countries, the role of NGOs has 
been further boosted by financial support from external agencies. However, NGOs continue to 
play a relatively minor role in education service delivery, despite the policy attention and 
external financial support (Nair, 2004).  
 
Policy recognition of the role of NGOs is also becoming evident in other countries. In 
Ethiopia, while the first Education Sector Development Plan (1995-2000) did not mention 
NGOs, the second Education Sector Development Plan (2000-2005) explicitly refers to NGOs 
with respect to their role in reaching marginalised groups (particularly in pastoralist areas of 
the country, supported by ActionAid and SCF-UK) with the aim of drawing on the 
international NGO resources they attract. This involves limited direct involvement of 
government in planning, management, design or running of the programmes (Rose, 2003b). 
Such formal recognition is not always the case, as is evident in the silence on NGO provision 
in Bangladesh’s Primary Education Development Plan II, despite the important role that 
NGOs play (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005). 
 
Even where NSPs are not explicitly recognised in education policy and plans, they may still 
engage with government in policy dialogue. The extent to which this is effective is likely to 
depend on the reason for dialogue – which is often related to NSPs wanting to influence 
government subsidisation and/or regulation of their provision, and/or advocacy to improve 
quality and accessibility of government provision. This dialogue may be constructive, but also 
often tokenistic or antagonistic. In many cases, high levels of distrust of NGOs among the 
government officials are reported. In all countries included in the USAID study, the 
government questions the motivation of NGOs. In Malawi, NGOs are frequently viewed as 
‘opportunistic’. In Ethiopia government officials often view them as ‘crooks’. NGOs can in 
some cases attempt to influence these negative views by working closely with government 
officials to encourage a more supportive relationship (Box 6).  
  39
Supporting Non-State Providers in Basic Education 
Box 6 Approaches to supporting an enabling environment for policy dialogue in 
Ethiopia 
 
Almost all NGOs working in education in Ethiopia offer workshops and presentations, as well 
as organise field visits for government personnel to illustrate their activities and approaches. 
Most NGOs are expected to include local government staff members in any training 
conducted for their own facilitators or for community members (Miller-Grandvaux, 2002). In 
some regions, a forum has been established between NGOs and regional education bureaus 
and zonal education departments to review alternative basic education programmes. The 
government has carried out its own evaluation of NGO alternative education programmes 
which highlights the innovations that these programmes provide, and finds that they could 
play an important role in supporting the provision of basic education. However, it notes that 
most programmes are relatively small-scale operating on modest resources from their funders, 
with limited evidence of opportunities for scaling up. In addition, it also indicates that 
experience on the ground can sometimes differ from the success story that is often depicted by 
NGOs themselves (MOE 2000). Government direct involvement of this kind can help in 
learning of lessons directly from NGO innovations, while understanding the constraints they 
face. 
 
(Source: Rose, 2003b). 
 
Across the NSP project countries, formal policy dialogue between government and non-state 
providers appears to have improved over the last decade – partly in response to the Education 
for All agenda which has united different providers in a common purpose, and partly as a 
result of the development of sector-wide approaches which encourage involvement of 
different stakeholders in policy design. In most cases, dialogue has been initiated by 
coalition/umbrella organisations that have been established, often in the 1990s, with the aim 
of providing a voice to non-state providers by strengthening the influence of individual 
providers through collective action, to pressurise governments to recognise their role and 
contribution. 
 
Where formal policy dialogue occurs, it is most often dominated by umbrella associations of 
registered, for-profit providers which are usually concerned with lobbying for government 
support to their provision (eg tax concessions and other forms of subsidy), rather than for pro-
poor provision. Their membership mainly comprises better-resourced private schools which 
have initiated the establishment of the association to strengthen their voice. In Malawi, the 
Private Schools Association of Malawi (PRISAM) was established in the mid-1990s with a 
particular concern of addressing the quality of education at secondary level in the context of 
the government’s education plans. The Ministry of Education has allowed PRISAM to 
participate in policy meetings, partly because PRISAM has the force of some international 
agencies behind it, notably the British Council and World Bank (Kadzamira and Rose, 2005). 
Chawani (nd) suggests a number of areas in which PRISAM and the Ministry of Education 
(MOEST) each consider they could liaise, coordinate and consult. He indicates that PRISAM 
is more ambitious and precise in its expectations of a relationship with MOEST, although it 
views government’s role primarily as supporting PRISAM through financial support. There is 
already experience of coordination in some areas, for example liaison over curriculum change 
and PRISAM’s involvement in revising the out-dated 1962 Education Act to account for 
private providers. However, given that clear guidelines for the relationship have not been set, 
engagement has been relatively ad hoc and subject to change.  
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In Nigeria, the Association of Private Proprietors of Schools (APPS), established in 1977, is a 
membership organisation of approved private schools also mainly serving higher-fee charging 
schools. There is a network of associations across the country (operating at the local, state and 
national levels) which appears to be well-established. In recent years, the Association has 
acted against the interests of more informal low budget private schools serving poorer 
communities by lobbying government to close down unregistered schools. APPS cites the 
government’s guideline that schools should not be established within one kilometre of another 
school, implying their main concern is to restrict competition (Adelabu and Rose, 2005). 
 
The Association of Formidable Educational Development (AFED) was established in Lagos 
in 2000 in response to the threat to close down unapproved schools. The Association is 
registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission and so has a legal status, even though 
schools which are members do not. It aims to influence policy through lobbying for a change 
to the criteria for regulation to make them more relevant and affordable for small-scale 
entrepreneurs providing education to low-income groups. Given that the Ministry of 
Education in Lagos is dominant in the policy arena (if not in provision) it has continued to 
adhere to strict regulations, while not being able to enforce them. AFED has succeeded in 
preventing school closure in part due to the strength of its leadership, as well as its ability to 
organise local support. The threat of political insecurity due to grassroots mobilisation has 
enabled the Association to delay closure of schools which would otherwise result in large 
numbers of children not having any school to attend (Adelabu and Rose, 2005).  
 
Dominance by associations serving the interests of higher-fee schools is also reflected in 
South Africa, where a coalition of umbrella associations has been formed under the National 
Alliance of Independent School Associations of Southern Africa (NAISA). The Alliance is 
weakened by divisions between the constituent associations which represent different group 
interests with different motivations. Overall, NAISA appears to be dominated by the 
Independent Schools Association of South Africa, mainly serving the elite end of private 
providers, who are mostly concerned with maintaining their autonomy. Inevitably, those 
representing the disadvantaged are less organised and, therefore, have less of a force in the 
dialogue (Motimele and Lewin, 2004). 
 
Dialogue of umbrella associations with government can sometimes be at best tokenistic or at 
worst antagonistic, with a tension evident between the desire of non-state providers to 
influence the government agenda at the same time as wanting to operate without interference. 
In Bangladesh, an umbrella organisation for NGOs, the Campaign for Popular Education, 
reports that while NGOs were involved in dialogue related to the development of the second 
Primary Education Development Programme, their proposals for including NGO provision 
within the plan were not taken into account (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005). The Pakistan 
Centre for Philanthropy, an NGO established with assistance from the Aga Khan Foundation, 
previously canvassed for the promulgation of a new law for the regulation of non-profit 
organisations to provide quality assurance both to the funders of such organisations and to 
their clients.  More recently, the Centre for Philanthropy has withdrawn from this campaign, 
fearing that any regulation of NGOs could be distorted into becoming a political instrument to 
constrain them (Hossain and Batley, 2005).  
 
In some cases attempts by private providers to put pressure on the government have been 
counterproductive. In South Africa, the Alliance of Black Independent Schools, an association 
representing low budget private schools in inner city areas and informal settlements in 
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Gauteng Province, and the Muslim Schools’ Association, representing the vast majority of 
Muslim schools in South Africa, felt that because they had been challenging the state on a 
number of policy and implementation issues (notably on the subsidy norm – see facilitation 
below), their members had been harassed by state officials. The harassment allegedly could 
include frequent visits to schools considered trouble-some, and deliberate delays and under-
payment of subsidies without which the schools could not function. As a result, both 
organisations have largely abandoned their advocacy role (Motimele and Lewin, 2004).  
 
Unresolved differences between non-state providers and government can sometimes lead to 
more extreme action. In both Nigeria and South Africa, tensions referred to above between 
umbrella associations and government have led to court action with mixed success for the 
private providers. Demands by the Non-Government Primary Teachers’ Association in 
Bangladesh for their schools and jobs to be nationalised, so that teachers in these schools 
receive the same conditions of service as those in government schools, have led to political 
pressure being exerted through strike action. Nationalisation is being resisted by the 
government, no doubt partly due to the financial implications, and the action is also 
discouraging the government from registering additional non-government schools for fear of 
giving them even greater influence (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005). 
 
Overall, there is limited evidence to indicate that the government’s engagement with the non-
state sector actually results in the government accommodating their views. Elaborating on 
experience in Pakistan, Khan (2004) writes ‘Despite much access, we were able to achieve 
little in terms of policy change, and the commitment to reform on the part of the military 
government seemed no more than skin-deep’ (Khan, 2004). He further adds: ‘The educational 
bureaucracy is large, unwieldy, and resistant to change. Despite, having an NGO background, 
the military government’s Federal Minister of Education made little headway in having true 
community participation adopted as a model for rural primary schooling.’  
 
Experience in the education sector highlights that, while NSPs are involved in formal policy 
dialogue primarily through umbrella associations, there is limited evidence of ‘real’ dialogue, 
and therefore of influence, in practice. Tokenistic dialogue may be beneficial to the 
government, particularly where this attracts donor support to sector development plans. 
However, the current approach to dialogue may have at best little benefit for non-state 
providers, and can actually threaten their ability to operate free of interference. 
6.2 Registration and Regulation 
Given that, in the education sector, much NSP provision has been growing by default, it has 
occurred without planned intervention or support by the government in many cases. As such, 
the main form of interaction between governments and NSPs tends to be through regulation, 
although this is most concerned with regulation of entry into the sector through stipulations on 
inputs.  
 
Where the de facto growth in private provision is being tolerated, it is likely that tighter 
regulation would be advocated. Regulation can be costly in terms of time and financial 
resources, if it is to be effective (Levin, 1999, cited in World Bank 2002c). The costs of 
regulation are largely unknown, although what indications there are suggest that in low 
enrolment countries regulation is widely underfunded.  
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On the other hand, where private education is being promoted on the grounds of providing 
competition and choice through the market (in particular by the International Finance 
Corporation and WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services), a light touch to regulation is 
advocated on the grounds that this will enable the market to operate without interference, 
allowing people to vote with their feet. For this to be successful, ‘clients’ require information 
about different providers and their services. Such information is often not readily available, 
and requires time and effort in its collection.  
6.2.1 Government regulation of private schools 
In all the DFID priority countries, legislation exists with respect to regulation of for-profit 
private schools. Regulation most often relates to stipulations regarding inputs to gain entry 
into the education market through registration, with limited concern for quality of provision 
and little, if any, guidelines on access for the poor or other excluded groups. In Pakistan, for 
example, registration involves recording complex information on school facilities and 
equipment – including number of maps, blackboards, cupboards etc. - with no measures for 
assessing standards of teaching (Hossain and Batley, 2005). Registration of schools often aims 
explicitly to restrict competition with government schools. In South Africa, government 
regulations discourage competition between public and independent schools by refusing 
subsidisation of new independent schools near existing public schools which are not full 
(Motimele and Lewin, 2004). In other NSP countries, regulations stipulate that private schools 
should not be established within a stated radius of an existing government school.  
 
In Lagos, schools are required to have proof of ownership of a plot of land, which is 
particularly unattainable for many small providers due to the high cost of land in the city. In 
addition, schools are expected to be purpose-built (rather than conversion of property initially 
built for other purposes including family housing, as is often the case), and have at least a 12 
classroom structure, the cost of which is likely to be prohibitive for small scale providers 
serving low income groups. These regulations were set in the 1970s when land was in relative 
abundance and so less expensive, and are central to the dispute between AFED and the 
government discussed above (Adelabu and Rose, 2005).  
 
In South Africa and Pakistan, accessibility is in principle assessed through government ruling 
on the level of fees that schools can charge (Motimele and Lewin, 2004; Hossain and Batley, 
2005). The regulatory framework, including requirements for quality assurance, is probably 
most developed in South Africa in the context of relatively strong state capacity. A myriad of 
new laws developed post-Apartheid have affected non-state provision. Key features include 
requirements of adherence to minimum standards and to the national curriculum, conditions 
for pro-poor subsidy of schools, establishment of taxation status, and identification of possible 
channels of financial support. The multiple layers of legislation, on the one hand, raise 
concern of excessive regulatory requirements which take up time and resources from school 
management but, on the other hand, offer incentives to facilitate their operation with particular 
concern for pro-poor provision (see facilitation below) (Motimele and Lewin, 2004). In other 
countries, quality of provision is most often addressed with respect to requirements for trained 
teachers. In low budget private schools, under-qualified teachers are often recruited on 
temporary contracts which means that they can be paid a lower wage and easily fired, 
allowing the schools to operate at relatively low cost. However, this means that the schools do 
not meet the formal standards of the Ministries of Education. 
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Private schools are often subject to greater regulation than their government school 
counterparts. The cases of Nigeria and South Africa highlight problems of multiple layers of 
accountability, where private providers are subject to regulations beyond the education sector. 
For example, independent schools in South Africa are also governed by legislation in relation 
to taxation and labour (Dieltens, 2002). In Nigeria, schools have to register with the 
Environmental Agency, Ministry of Health, Fire Brigade, Water Corporation etc, each of 
which demand registration fees. Similarly in Pakistan, Kardar’s (2001) survey of schools in 
Pakistan shows that the procedure for registration has an intrusive intent although 
enforcement mechanisms were weak. The complexity of the legislation in these countries can 
result in considerable time and cost to ensure that regulations are complied with. 
 
A one-off or annual fee is often payable, which can be a deterrent to registration. In Lagos, 
while total official costs of registration appear relatively modest (approximately the amount 
received from annual fees obtained from seven students in a middle-range unapproved school, 
compared with around one student in an approved school), low budget private schools claim 
that they are already stretched to cover essential running costs. Moreover, in addition to 
official registration fees, AFED members complained that there are often additional 
‘unofficial’ costs which have to be paid, which can be considerably higher than the official 
fees (Adelabu and Rose, 2005). Even though the education system in Lagos is heavily 
dependent on the private sector, it appears that the process of gaining approval is both 
cumbersome and costly, acting as a disincentive for schools to seek approval.  
 
By contrast, registration fees are not charged in Malawi. Even so, schools often remain 
unregistered. In practice, the government does not have the capacity to deal with the 
proliferation of private schools that have emerged. For example, there is just one person in the 
Ministry of Education responsible for registration of all primary schools (private and public). 
Confusion also arises as a result of a lack of standardised licensing procedures which means 
that different standards are often adopted in practice (Chimombo et al., 2004). A lack of 
understanding by private providers of the processes for registration can be an additional 
reason for their unregistered status (Kadzamira and Rose, 2005).  
 
The first step for enforcement of registration of private providers is recognition that they exist. 
Where the capacity of governments to support their own provision is limited, there is a 
tendency to turn a blind eye – particularly where human and financial resources are limited. 
Enforcement of registration is difficult in countries where government schools themselves 
often do not meet the criteria set. Unregistered schools have, therefore, been allowed to 
operate ‘illegally’ although attempts to clamp down on this are evident in Lagos, as 
mentioned above, even though government has the right to fine and/or imprison proprietors 
who are operating illegally, as stipulated in the Education Law. Unregistered schools are, 
therefore, flourishing in the context of dominant but ineffective ministries. In other cases, 
schools are able to register even though they do not meet the criteria. In Enugu, the Ministry 
of Education estimates that only 20 percent of registered schools have met the requirement of 
owning of a plot of land. In addition, some do not have sufficient numbers of qualified 
teachers, even though there is a sufficient number of unemployed qualified teachers available 
(Adelabu and Rose, 2005).  
 
Alternatively, government recognition of its inability to regulate has resulted in the 
Government of Madhya Pradesh in India lifting restrictions on opening of private schools and 
obtaining recognition, which is reported to have led to a sharp increase in the number of 
private schools. Reasons given for government lifting of restrictions is that they were 
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ineffective in any case, and so being bypassed, at the same time as an ideological shift 
towards seeing private schools as a means of reducing the burden on limited public resources 
– with, in principle, public resources focusing on those unable to attend private schools 
(Leclercq, 2002, cited in Nair, 2004). 
 
Registration is most likely to occur where it is related to incentives, for example in the form of 
subsidies in South Africa, and payment of teacher salaries etc. in RNGPS in Bangladesh (see 
below). Another motivation evident across the countries is that schools need to be registered 
in order to enter children for examinations. However, some schools get around this by 
forming alliances with government schools or registered private schools (sometimes through 
payment of a ‘fee’). Alternatively, parents move their children to a government school in the 
final year in order to take government examinations.  
 
Even where schools are registered, in all the NSP project countries there is limited evidence of 
on-going monitoring and supervision, as government supervisors struggle to support their own 
schools. This can be further complicated by lack of clarity with regard to responsibilities for 
supervision, and opportunities for rent-seeking. Within Lagos State, there are two types of 
inspection of private schools – one based in the Directorate of Private Education, and the 
other in the Inspectorate arm of the Ministry of Education. Some proprietors in the State 
claimed that inspectors prefer to visit private schools (including unapproved ones), as they 
expect them to pay money to ensure they receive favourable reports (Adelabu and Rose, 
2005). Constraints to inspection suggests that even though the government is not particularly 
successful at regulating entry of schools into the education market, it is even less effective at 
on-going monitoring of the quality of registered schools, with extremely limited effort at 
monitoring accessibility of different groups (including the poor) to the services provided. 
6.2.2 Government regulation of NGO and other forms of provision 
Arrangements for regulation of NGOs often differ from those of private providers. It can 
occur independently of ministries of education, and NGOs are often not assessed on the basis 
of education-related criteria. Regulation of NGOs is more frequently related to government’s 
desire to maintain control of financial resources particularly where donors are funding NGOs 
directly. In Bangladesh, NGOs such as BRAC receiving funds from external sources have to 
register with the NGO Affairs Bureau. The Bureau is supposed to liaise with appropriate focal 
points in sectoral ministries. In practice, the NGO Affairs Bureau reported that approximately 
half of applications do not receive comments from the Ministry of Education, and only a few 
are turned down (usually on the grounds of duplication with activities already being 
undertaken by the government, but also implying that competition between government and 
NGO activities is not encouraged). The NGO Affairs Bureau is also responsible for receiving 
and checking audit and performance reports, while sectoral ministries are not involved in 
supervision of education provision by NGOs. The capacity of the bureau is weak, with only 
two auditors for all NGOs registered (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005). Similarly, in India, 
regulation of NGOs appears to focus more on checking for fraud and corruption, rather than 
on service delivery (Nair, 2004). 
 
Similarly, Kadzamira and Kunje (2002) report that in Malawi, every NGO interviewed 
expressed how difficult it was to register. The relatively new Non-Governmental 
Organizations Act has created an NGO Registration Board, with members selected from the 
government to oversee NGO activities. A precondition for NGO registration is that the NGO 
must be a member of a government-sponsored umbrella organisation and have letters of 
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permission from the appropriate ministry indicating the sectors in which the NGO will be 
allowed to operate. 
 
Alternatively, where NGO provision is subject to the same regulations as formal schools, 
experience from the Village-based Schools programme in Malawi indicates that this can result 
in imposition of rigid criteria on systems that are intended to be flexible. Most of the 
innovations of the programme were a departure from the Ministry of Education’s norms and 
standards. There was a fear on the part of government that if NGOs were given a free reign, it 
would lose control over the education system (Kadzamira and Rose, 2005). Recruitment of 
teachers was a particular area of contention. In contrast to the centralised recruitment and 
deployment of teachers in government schools, teachers were recruited locally by community 
members with particular attention to the recruitment of female teachers to serve as role 
models for girls. There were, however, insufficient applicants available locally with minimum 
levels of qualification to meet government requirements. Government insistence on standards, 
particularly related to teacher qualifications, led to the abandonment of the programme which 
did not extend beyond a pilot. Thus, despite the positive outcomes of the VBS programme and 
the success of its interventions in teacher training and supervision and, to some extent, 
community participation, government was more concerned with enforcing standards and 
adhering to current policy prescriptions even though these have not been entirely successful to 
ensure quality education in government schools, and contradict the intended flexibility of this 
form of provision aimed at those excluded from the formal system (Kadzamira and Rose, 
2005).   
 
Religious schools might also face different forms of registration procedures. Post September 
11, the Government of Pakistan has been forced to check the rise of madrasahs in Pakistan 
due to international pressure. In 2003, a US $ 225 million package, to be spent over three 
years, was committed to madrasah reform.12 As part of the reform plan a Madrasah Ordinance 
Board has been promulgated under which all Madrasahs are required to be registered.  
However, only 11,000 Madrasahs of up to 40,000 in existence had submitted registration 
papers by March 2002. Others were being given incentives to submit to the requirements of 
this new law, including training for madrasah teachers plus financial incentives to the 
madrasahs’ management in the form of money for teachers’ salaries, textbooks, stationary, 
computers, and furniture. However, the majority of the madrasahs have refused to register to 
date.   
6.2.3 Self-regulation 
Self-regulation in the education sector has often evolved through the initiative of umbrella 
associations of private providers. In South Africa, ISASA, as the largest and most established 
association, has initiated its own quality assurance and accreditation system. This appears 
partly to be an attempt to pre-empt the imposition of a government system. It seems a 
constructive approach to partnership with government, and could contribute to growth in state 
capacity. However, the initiative has occurred independently of associations representing 
other private providers with the danger that it could reflect the interests of the more elite end 
of non-state provision (Motimele and Lewin, 2004). In Pakistan, an embryonic system of self-
regulation in Karachi has developed with the Aga Khan Foundation working with the 
Association of Private Schools to develop an accreditation scheme to ensure quality and 
                                                 
12 Madrasa Reforms (Teaching of Formal Subjects in Deeni Madaris), fact sheet hosted on website of the 
Embassy of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Washington D.C.: http://www.embassyofpakistan.org/
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financial standards (Hossain and Batley, 2005). Similarly, in Malawi, there is a proposal for 
PRISAM to take responsibility for accreditation of private schools and provide a PRISAM 
‘kitemark’, awarded on the basis of criteria agreed with the Ministry of Education (Chawani, 
nd). However, it is not clear to whom PRISAM, or other self-regulatory bodies, would be 
accountable, with concern that low budget schools serving the poor could be adversely 
affected.  
 
In Bangladesh, BRAC is reported to be unique in the country in having a good monitoring 
process which includes following up on NGOs to which they sub-contract, although NGOs 
outside its sphere of influence are not supported by this (Chowdhury and Rose, 2005). In 
addition, the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy has developed a certification regime for non-
profit organisations. This endeavours to set sector-wide standards of good internal 
governance, transparent financial management and effective programme delivery. 
Certification is voluntary - an NGO may either wish to register in order to enhance its 
credibility and/or to obtain tax benefits from the Central Board of Revenue. However, there is 
some concern that the hurdles for approval may be set too high which could exclude those 
providing services to poorer communities, with more limited access to resources (Hossain and 
Batley, 2005). 
 
These examples indicate that self-regulation is being developed in contexts where government 
regulation is either absent or dysfunctional, usually in contexts where state capacity is low. 
Experience with self-regulation suggests that lessons can be learnt from innovations 
particularly with regard to quality assurance. However, given that it tends to be controlled by 
more established and better resourced providers, there is a continued need for the government 
to play a role in supervising standards across all types of providers both in relation to quality 
and accessibility.  
 
Overall, evidence indicates that governments show a greater tendency to attempt to control 
entry of NSPs into the education sector based on criteria which government schools 
themselves are unlikely to be able to meet. However, in practice, governments are likely to 
turn a blind eye to illegal private providers given that they are aware of the contribution that 
these schools are making in filling the gap in provision due to their inability to provide. Less 
attention is often paid to monitoring quality and accessibility to non-government schools, due 
to demands on resources beyond their capacity. 
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7. Conclusion 
In many low-income countries, government remains the principal provider of primary 
education. Most stakeholders (including NGOs and the government itself) continue to view 
this as its responsibility with non-state provision seen as complementary to this. In general, 
evidence indicates that, where innovations are occurring with respect to non-state provision, 
there has been limited deliberate intent on the part of the government to support provision to 
those underserved by the state system.  
 
There are a number of inter-related conditions influencing the strength of the relationship 
between governments and NSPs that can be drawn from examples presented in the paper 
(Table 6). First, in general, this can depend on the extent to which they are dependent on each 
other (in the case of NSPs, this may be dependency on government resources, and for 
governments could refer to dependency on the service delivery provided by NSPs to achieve 
their stated goals). Second, the characteristics of the state will clearly play a role in 
determining the extent to which NSPs are encouraged and/or supported. Such characteristics 
include its own capacity and political will, the extent of democracy which influences 
accountability to the electorate, and its political and economic ideology. Third, the 
characteristics of civil society will influence the extent to which NSPs can develop to deliver 
services to underserved groups, and have the motivation to do so. This might depend on the 
extent of a middle-class/elite motivated to improve the livelihoods of the less wealthy.13 In 
addition, relationships will be influenced by the extent to which government provision is 
falling short of achieving EFA and national goals – whether this is widespread, limited to 
particular groups of the population, or mainly related to filling gaps in quality of government 
provision. This will have implications for the types of providers involved in service delivery, 
which in turn will influence the type of support governments give to NSPs, and their relations 
with respect to policy dialogue and regulation. Each of these factors is likely to affect forms of 
donor support – whether directly to NSPs or through government. 
 
Service delivery to under-served groups through NGO provision has been found to be most 
effective in circumstances such as Bangladesh where there is a relatively weak state and 
strong civil society, permitting NGOs to operate relatively free of interference, but with some 
level of common understanding between government and the NGOs. Alternatively, in 
countries such as Malawi, characterised by relatively weak civil society, international NGO 
efforts to support provision to hard-to-reach children has proved unsustainable in the context 
of a dominant, centralised ministry keen to ensure control over the sector. Experience in these 
countries and elsewhere highlight on-going mutual mistrust between non-state providers and 
government which hinders constructive collaboration. 
 
                                                 
13 Sector-specific Drivers of Change research currently under preparation should be able to provide further 
insights into the characteristics of the state and civil society for education service delivery.  
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Coalition and umbrella organisations have been playing an important role in recent years, 
providing a voice for private providers, some of whom consider that the role of government 
needs to shift from principal provider to facilitator. The associations’ involvement with 
government has often arisen with respect to specific concerns, rather than through sustained, 
on-going collaboration. As experience from Nigeria and South Africa indicates, collusion 
between elite, established providers with respect to quality assurance through such 
organisations can be at the expense of those potentially providing services to the poor. In 
general, evidence suggests that their role needs to be seen as complementary to, rather than a 
substitute for, government roles and responsibilities. AFED in Nigeria is an interesting 
exception, providing an example of an umbrella association supporting informal, unregistered 
schools in response to pressures to close them down from registered schools and the 
government. 
 
Experience also highlights mutual dependence of different forms of collaboration between 
non-state providers and government, which can create tension both amongst different non-
state providers, as well as between them and governments. A high level of engagement in 
terms of clearly defined state purchase of NSP to support pro-poor provision in South Africa 
and Bangladesh, for example, often requires a high level of engagement with government with 
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respect to meeting regulatory requirements. On the one hand, this may encourage dialogue 
where the requirements are considered inappropriate or inaccessible. On the other hand, this 
dialogue often becomes antagonistic, either putting providers at risk of losing government 
incentives, or resulting in non-state providers withdrawing from dialogue to avoid this risk. 
Moving towards ‘real’, on-going dialogue is required to ensure collaboration between non-
state providers and the government benefits the underserved, and so assists in moving towards 
the achievement of Education for All. 
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Africa        
Congo -- 85.5 40  19.0 Yes 26 
Ethiopia 46.2 63.9 24  6.0 No 55 
Ghana 60.2 81.4 64  18.3 Yes 31 
Kenya 69.9 96.0 63 0.4 5.6 No 34 
Lesotho 84.4 124.3 68 27.0 0.0 No 47 
Malawi 81.0 145.8 64  -- Yes 70 
Nigeria  95.6 67  -- Yes 42 
Rwanda 84.0 117.0 28 6.9 115 Yes 60 
Sierra Leone -- 78.9 32  -- -- -- 
S Africa 89.5 105.1  14.0 2.0 No 34 
Sudan  -- 58.7   4.7 Yes 29 
Tanzania 54.4 69.4 60  0.2 Yes 53 
Uganda -- 136.4 65  4.9 No 53 
Zambia 66.0 78.8 73  -- No 43 
Zimbabwe 82.7 99.0  13.2 87.3 No 39 
        
Asia        
Afghanistan -- 22.6   -- -- 61 
Bangladesh 86.6 97.5 70 7.3 38.7 Yes 56 
Cambodia 86.2 123.4 70 3.2 0.9 Yes 56 
China 94.6 116.2  6.1 -- Yes 21 
India 82.3 98.1 76 7.2 15.5 Yes 41 
Indonesia 92.1 110.9 91 3.2 16.0 No 20 
Nepal 70.5 121.6 65 14.2 7.0 Yes 36 
Pakistan 59.1 73.2 59  -- No 40 
Vietnam 94.0 103.4 101  0.3 Yes 28 
                                                 
14 Data in columns 2, 3, 6, & 7 is drawn from USESCO, EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005.  
Data in columns 4, 5, & 8 is drawn from The World Bank, World Development Report 2004.   
 







The paper reviews evidence on non-state providers (NSPs) involved in providing education to the underserved in 
the context of the drive towards achieving Education for All goals. It considers the comparative advantages that 
NSPs are commonly understood to possess in education service delivery. It also reviews the forms and implications 
of engagement between NSPs and the state that occur in the process of such service delivery. The paper argues that 
there is a need for greater, and more constructive, engagement between NSPs and the state to ensure collaboration 
benefits the underserved, and so assists in moving towards the achievement of Education for All. 
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